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1. INTRODUCTION
Student activismI has been part of the fabric of American higher education
since the eighteenth century. 2 Indeed, some scholars have called it "as American
as apple pie." 3 From Harvard's "Great Butter Rebellion" in 1766 when students
pushed for better food4 to the multicultural movement of today when students
have demanded increased diversity in student, staff, faculty, and curriculum, 5
students have long pressed to have their voices heard. Continuing in this
tradition, we now live in an age of student activists who, by organizing through
social media, 6 are getting more people involved in political conversations and
causes than would otherwise be possible.7 On reflecting upon the relationship
IFor this Article, I use the definition of "student activism" from Tony Chambers and
Christine Phelps, who observe, "We recognize that there are acts of social and political
engagement whose primary purpose is nonproductive destruction and disruption. But our
discussion speaks to activist behaviors whose purpose is to create change in order to address
perceived or real inequities between and among individuals, groups, and/or systems." Tony
Chambers & Christine E. Phelps, Student Activism as a Form of Leadership and Student
Development, 31 NASPA J. 19, 20 (1993).
2 For a discussion of student activism in higher education, see generally STEVEN J.
NOVAK, THE RIGHTS OF YOUTH: AMERICAN COLLEGES AND STUDENT REVOLT, 1798-1815
(1977); REBELLION IN BLACK AND WHITE: SOUTHERN STUDENT ACTIVISM IN THE 1960s
(Robert Cohen & David J. Snyder eds., 2013); ROBERT A. RHOADS, FREEDOM'S WEB:
STUDENT ACTIVISM IN AN AGE OF CULTURAL DIVERSITY (Johns Hopkins Paperbacks ed.
2000); Joy ANN WILLIAMSON, BLACK POWER ON CAMPUS: THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS,
1965-75 (2003); Christopher J. Broadhurst, Campus Activism in the 21st Century: A
Historical Framing, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR HIGHER EDUC., Fall 2014, at 3; Philip Lee, The
Case of Dixon v. Alabama: From Civil Rights to Students' Rights and Back Again, 116
TCHRS. C. REC. 1 (2014).
3 FRANK L. ELLSWORTH & MARTHA A. BURNS, STUDENT ACTIVISM IN AMERICAN
HIGHER EDUCATION 5 (1970).
4 See SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THREE CENTURIES OF HARVARD, 1636-1936, at 117-
18 (13th prtg. 2001); Corydon Ireland, Harvard's Long-Ago Student Risings, HARV.
GAZETTE (Apr. 19, 2012), http://news.harvard.edulgazette/story/2012/04/harvards-long-ago-
student-risings/ [https://perma.cc/LC2A-PHFB].
5 See RHOADS, supra note 2, at vii, 1-12; Philip Lee, The Griswold 9 and Student
Activism for Faculty Diversity at Harvard School in the Early 1990s, 27 HARV. J. ON RACIAL
& ETHNIC JUST. 49, 49 (2011).
61 refer to social media broadly as applications and websites that allow their users to
generate and share content with each other.
7 Twitter, for example, is known for its hashtag campaigns that bring attention to an
issue and mobilize large groups of people. A hashtag is a word or phrase preceded by the
hash or pound sign (#) that social media users can use to identify messages on specific topics.
See How To Use Hashtags, TWITTER, https://supporutwitter.com/articles/49309-using-hashtags-
on-twitter# [https://perma.ce/78QH-4ZPC]. Hashtags were created organically by Twitter users
as a means to search tweets based on message content. Id When social media users tweet
and retweet messages with the same hashtags, these hashtags start to trend and the issues that
these messages are connected to become more visible to the public. Id College activists
around the country have used Twitter to communicate and organize. See, e.g, Being 'Black
on Campus'-Frustrations Spread Across US, BBC NEWS (Nov. 12, 2015),
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between social media and political activism, John G. Palfrey noted, "Twitter and
Facebook have played a crucial role in almost any mass protest in the last few
years." 8 A recent example is #BlackLivesMatter.9
http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-34799061 [https://perma.cc/5KXD-MJ5R] (describing
how student activists are communicating and organizing through #BlackOnCampus across
the country).
8 Caroline M. McKay, Facebook at Center of Egypt Protests, HARv. CRIMSON (Feb.
3, 2011), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2011/2/3/facebook-twitter-govemment-intemet/
[https*//perma.ce/UM7K-MWAN]. Indeed, protesters all over the world are using social media
to communicate their goals and organize their tactics. See, e.g., WAEL GHONIM, REVOLUTION
2.0: THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE IS GREATER THAN THE PEOPLE IN POWER: A MEMOIR (2012)
(chronicling the role of social media in fomenting and supporting the protests behind Arab
Spring); PHILIP N. HOWARD & MUZAMMIL M. HUSSAIN, DEMOCRACY'S FOURTH WAVE?:
DIGITAL MEDIA AND THE ARAB SPRING (2013) (exploring the creative digital activism during
Arab Spring); Pablo Barbera & Megan Metzger, How Ukrainian Protesters Are Using
Twitter and Facebook, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
monkey-cage/wp/2013/12/04/strategic-use-of-facebook-and-twitter-in-ukrainian-protests/ [httpsil/
perma.cc/MXG8-Y2LG] (discussing how people are interacting with a Ukrainian protestor's
Facebook page); id ("The 2000 updates posted on the page since it was created have
garnered close to 50,000 comments and over a million likes; and their content has been
shared over 230,000 times."); Bezdomny, Firechat Enables Activist Mesh Network in Hong
Kong, SHAREABLE (Oct. 20, 2014), http://www.shareable.net/blog/firechat-enables-activist-
mesh-network-in-hong-kong [https://perma.cc/YY3D-RBFF] (detailing how protesters in
Hong Kong are using the social media platform Firechat to create a peer-to-peer "meshnet"
that makes government surveillance difficult because it is independent of mobile and Internet
networks). And governments are trying to thwart them by banning or controlling access to
social media. See, e.g., Sebnem Arsu, Turkey Threatens To Block Social Media over
Released Documents, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/17/world/
europe/turkey-threatens-to-block-social-media-over-released-documents.html (on file with
Ohio State Law Journal) ("Turkish officials threatened to shut down Twitter in the country
unless the social-media company blocked the account of a left-wing newspaper that had
circulated documents about a military police raid on Turkish Intelligence Agency trucks that
were traveling to Syria last January."); Tania Branigan, China Intensifies Crackdown on
Social Media with Curbs on Instant Messaging, GUARDIAN (Aug. 7, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/07/china-intensifies-social-media-crackdown-curbs-
instart-messaging [https://perma.cc/LH3M-4M3H] ("China has issued tough new rules for
mobile instant messaging services such as WeChat, expanding an internet crackdown that
has already muzzled microblogs and websites in what it called a bid to promote 'true freedom
of speech."'); Melissa Etehad, Why Are Twitter and Facebook Still Blocked in Iran?, AL
JAZEERA AMERICA: OPINION (Apr. 19, 2014), http-/america.aljazeeracom/opinions/2014/4/iran-
twitter-rouhaniintemetcensorship.html [https://perma.cc/LR62-BTZ4] ("Officially, access to
social networks such as Twitter and Facebook is banned-leaving Iranians unable to legally
access these sites. Iranians still find ways to access them by illegally downloading virtual
private networks to bypass the state's Internet filtering system. According to Iran's Ministry
of Sciences, 60 percent of Iranian university students use Viber and WeChat, and in a
survey ... of 2,300 people, 58 percent reported using Facebook regularly, and 37 percent
said they used Google+.").
9 Dani McClain, The Black Lives Matter Movement Is Most Visible on Twitter. Its True
Home Is Elsewhere, NATION (Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/black-lives-
matter-was-born-on-twitter-will-it-die-there/ [https://perma.cc/J3VC-67GK] ("Today's racial-
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After George Zimmerman was acquitted of murder in July 2013 for the
killing of Trayvon Martin, an unarmed African American teenager,1 0 Alicia
Garza, a special projects director for the National Domestic Workers Alliance
and her friend, Patrisse Cullors, a community organizer working on prison
reform, along with Opal Tometi, an activist for immigrant rights, developed the
hashtag "#BlackLivesMatter." 1 Garza explained the purpose of her social
media campaign as, "A call to action .... To make sure we are creating a world
where black lives actually do matter."1 2 She also stated, "We understand
organizing not to happen online but to be built through face-to-face connections
and relationships where we build the trust necessary to move as a collective and
exercise our collective power in order to win changes in our lives."1 3 Yet, social
media has helped this effort by facilitating these face-to-face connections. 14
justice movement demands an end to the disproportionate killing of black people by law-
enforcement officials and vigilantes, and seeks to root out white supremacy wherever it lives.
Social media has allowed its members to share documentary evidence of police abuse, spread
activist messages, and forge a collective meaning out of heartrending news. At certain key
moments, Twitter in particular has reflected and reinforced the power of this movement.").
Note that Twitter is just one tool, out of many, that activists can employ to communicate
with others. Bijan Stephen explains:
If you're a civil rights activist in 2015 and you need to get some news out, your first
move is to choose a platform. If you want to post a video of a protest or a violent arrest,
you put it up on Vine, Instagram, or Periscope. If you want to avoid trolls or snooping
authorities and you need to coordinate some kind of action, you might chat privately
with other activists on GroupMe. If you want to rapidly mobilize a bunch of people you
know and you don't want the whole world clued in, you use SMS or WhatsApp. If you
want to mobilize a ton of people you might not know and you do want the whole world
to talk about it: Twitter.
Bijan Stephen, How Social Media Helps Black Lives Matter Fight the Power, WIRED, Nov.
2015, http://www.wired.com/2015/10/how-black-lives-matter-uses-social-media-to-fight-the-
power/ [https-//perma.ccS4QX-F6H2]. And these tools continue to evolve.10 Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman Is Acquitted in Trayvon Martin Killing,
N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/us/george-zimmerman-
verdict-trayvon-martin.html (on file with Ohio State Law Journal).
I1 See Elizabeth Day, #BlackLivesMatter: The Birth of a New Civil Rights Movement,
GUARDIAN (July 19,2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/19/blacklivesmatter
-birth-civil-rights-movement [https://perma.cc/4PWU-T39H]; Jessica Guynn, Meet the Woman
Who Coined #BlackLivesMatter, USA TODAY (Mar. 4, 2015), http-//www.usatoday.com/story/
tech/2015/03/04/alicia-garza-black-lives-matter/24341593/ [https://perma.cc/D3R2-CTTC].
12 Day, supra note 11.13 Guynn, supra note 11.14 Day, supra note 11 ("The new movement is powerful yet diffuse, linked not by
physical closeness or even necessarily by political consensus, but by the mobilising force of
social media. A hashtag on Twitter can link the disparate fates of unarmed black men shot
down by white police in a way that transcends geographical boundaries and time zones. A
shared post on Facebook can organise a protest in a matter of minutes. Documentary photos
and videos can be distributed on Tumblr pages and Periscope feeds, through Instagrams and
Vines. Power lies in a single image. Previously unseen events become unignorable.").
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Recently, #BlackLivesMatter facilitated communication with activists
around the country, helping to mobilize a new wave of nation-wide activism
around the police killings of Michael Brown, Eric Garner, and many others. 15
Protestors all over the country have connected with each other by posting and
searching for this hashtag. James Taylor observed that "[#]Black Lives Matter"
may be the most potent slogan since "Black Power," which Kwame Ture
(formerly Stokely Carmichael) introduced to a crowd of civil rights activists
almost fifty years ago. 16
The #BlackLivesMatter movement has had real-world influence. For
example, in the aftermath of highly publicized deaths of two African Americans
at the hands of police officers-Michael Brown and Freddie Gray-it has
pressured the Department of Justice to investigate the policing practices of
Ferguson, Missouri and Baltimore, Maryland. 17 It has pushed states to remove
the Confederate flag and other Confederate symbols from government buildings
and public spaces.' 8 It has forced politicians to address issues of racial justice
and criminal justice reform. 19
The movement has also influenced student activism for racial justice on
university campuses. For example, in 2015, Harvard University students
mobilized through #BlackLivesMatter and organized marches, panel
discussions, teach-ins, and die-ins. 20 During the same time, on the opposite
coast, at the University of California, Berkeley, students and community
15 Jonathan Capehart, From Trayvon Martin to 'Black Lives Matter,' WASH. POST (Feb.
27, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2015/02/ 2 7/from-trayvon-
martin-to-black-lives-matter/ [https://perma.ccl4QXX-DEJE].
16 Guynn, supra note 11.
17 See Susannah Cullinane, Ferguson Commits to DOJReforms, CNN (Mar. 18, 2016),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/18/us/ferguson-justice-department-agreement-filed/index.html
[https//perma.cc/LHG8-BHCP]; John Verhovek, Justice Department Opens Investigation into
Baltimore Death, CNN (Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/21/politics/justice-
department-baltimore-death/ [https://perma.cc/P62Q-RHNQ].
18See Greg Botelho & Emanuella Grinberg, Woman Climbs Pole, Removes
Confederate Flag, CNN (June 27, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/27/politics/south-
carolina-confederate-flag/ [https://perma.cc/UMU7-HDNZ] (detailing Bree Newsome's
activism to remove the Confederate flag from the South Carolina capitol); Campbell
Robertson et al., Calls To Drop Confederate Emblems Spread Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES (June
23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/24/us/south-carolina-nikki-haley-confederate-
flag.html (on file with Ohio State Law Journal) (discussing the intersection of
#BlackLivesMatter and the efforts to remove the Confederate flag).
19 Sara Sidner & Mallory Simon, The Rise ofBlack Lives Matter: Trying To Break the
Cycle of Violence and Silence, CNN (Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/28/us/
black-lives-matter-evolution/ [https://perma.cc/8TSZ-8TK6].
2 0 Nina Luo, #blacklivesmatter, HARV. CRIMSON: FIFTEEN MINUTES MAG. (Feb. 12,
2015), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2015/2/12/scrutiny-black-lives-matter/ [https://perma.cc
/5NSB-XMW6]; see also Christina Pazzanese, After Ferguson, the Ripples Across Harvard,
HARv. L. TODAY (Mar. 5, 2015), http://today.law.harvard.edu/ferguson-ripples-across-harvard/
[https//permacc/5AXG-PKXQ].
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members also held protests against racism as part of the #BlackLivesMatter
movement. 21 Similar protests arose on college campuses all over the country. 22
Social media has made it much easier for college students to voice their
opinions and engage in campus protest. But what right do students have to
engage in campus activism? How should colleges and universities balance the
multiple interests at stake when students engage in protest? Although the
illustrating example I chose for this Article centers on racial justice, my
proposed student academic freedom protection would apply to other forms of
activism as well.
In this Article, moving away from the First Amendment principles that
would apply only to public institutions, I explore contractual student academic
freedom as a broader protection for students to engage in their protest activities
at both public and private universities. Most importantly, I argue that higher
education institutions should codify a balancing test into free speech policies
that takes into account this freedom-conceptualized as the students' freedom
to learn and also participate in teaching others through their own learning-
among other competing interests.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II analyzes the historical context of
racial exclusion in American higher education and connects it to modern efforts
to promote racial justice to illustrate a continuum of students pressing for this
type of change. Part III outlines the inadequacies of student academic freedom
as articulated by courts defining this freedom in relation to the First
Amendment. Part IV proposes a new mechanism based on contract law that
would incorporate major higher education policy statements on student
academic freedom that conceptualize this freedom through a learning principle
as legally binding obligations between universities and their students. Finally,
Part V explores how my proposed student academic freedom would balance the
tensions between free speech and student demands for racial justice by
employing a test that takes both "the marketplace of ideas" and student freedom
to learn into account. My thesis is that colleges and universities should move
away from the question, "how do we stop our student activists," and start asking,
"what are students learning from their activism and what, in turn, can our
institutions learn from it?"
21 Delency Parham, Protesters Rally in Berkeley To Show Solidarity with Black
Students Across the Nation, BERKELEYSIDE (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.berkeleyside.com/
2015/11/19 /protesters-rally-in-berkeley-in-solidarity-with-black-students-across-the-nation/
[httpsi//perma.c/LW4G-9JMW|.
22 Anemona Hartocollis & Jess Bidgood, Racial Discrimination Protests ignite at
Colleges Across the US, N.Y. TIMEs (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/12/
us/racial-discrmination-protests-ignite-at-colleges-acmss-the-us.htl] (on file with Ohio State
Law Journal).
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II. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF RACIAL EXCLUSION ON AMERICAN
COLLEGE CAMPUSES
To make sense of contemporary student activism for racial equity and
inclusion, it should be viewed in a historical context in which racial minorities
were excluded from equal educational opportunities through state segregation
laws.23 These laws were upheld in Plessy v. Ferguson as constitutional under
the Separate-But-Equal doctrine. 24
A number of challenges to the exclusion of racial minorities in higher
education, brought by students seeking educational equity and inclusion, started
gaining traction in the 1930s to 1950s-the facts of these cases illustrate the
degree of historical racial exclusion in American higher education. 25 While all
of these cases occur off campus because excluded students were fighting for
inclusion, they nonetheless illustrate that much can be learned about pressing
societal issues by students fighting the status quo. For example, in Missouri ex
rel. Gaines v. Canada, African American applicant Lloyd Gaines was refused
admission to the University of Missouri Law School because of state
segregation laws.26 When he applied to the law school, he was rejected based
on his race and referred to a funding program that enabled African American
2 3 See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding Separate-But-Equal
law in Louisiana railroad car segregation law), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954); Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 87 (1927) (applying Plessy to uphold the exclusion
of Chinese American children from an elementary school designated for whites based on a
Mississippi segregation law); see also RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF
BROWN V BOARD OFEDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 28 (1975)
("Among the more insistently enforced sections of the black codes was the prohibition
against teaching a slave to read or write or giving him or her pamphlets, not excluding the
Bible or religious tracts. So apprehensive were members of the slavocracy about the great
mischief that literacy might stir that in many states it was illegal to teach free as well as
enslaved Negroes. And slave schools, of course, were unknown."). Note that educational
exclusion was not the only tool of racial oppression. For Native American peoples, schools
have historically been used as a white supremacist tool to eradicate indigenous cultures. See
DAVID WALLACE ADAMS, EDUCATION FOR EXTINCTION: AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE
BOARDING SCHOOL EXPERIENCE, 1875-1928, at 336-37 (1995) ("In the final analysis, the
boarding school story constitutes yet another deplorable episode in the long and tragic history
of Indian-white relations. For tribal elders who had witnessed the catastrophic developments
of the nineteenth century-the bloody warfare, the near-extinction of the bison, the scourge
of disease and starvation, the shrinking of the tribal land base, the indignities of reservation
life, the invasion of missionaries and white settlers-there seemed to be no end to the
cruelties perpetuated by whites. And after all this, the schools. After all this, the white man
had concluded that the only way to save Indians was to destroy them, that the last great Indian
war should be waged against children.").
24 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 540 (upholding a statute that provided "that all railway companies
carrying passengers in their coaches in this State, shall provide equal but separate
accommodations for the white, and colored races").
2 5 See generally KLUGER, supra note 23 (discussing racial exclusion in American
education).
2 6 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 343 (1938).
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state residents like himself to attend law schools outside of the state. 27 Gaines
brought a successful challenge to the state's refusal to provide African
Americans in-state legal education.2 8 Gaines taught the University of Missouri
Law School-and anyone who observed his struggle for inclusion-that racial
segregation was not going to be accepted passively by the students who were
being unfairly denied educational opportunities.
In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, George McLaurin, an African
American student, was first denied admissions to the University of Oklahoma
to pursue a doctorate in education because of his race, but was subsequently
admitted to the university "upon a segregated basis." 29 McLaurin challenged the
state-imposed conditions as constitutional violations. 30 These segregated
conditions were described by the Court:
[H]e was required to sit apart at a designated desk in an anteroom adjoining the
classroom; to sit at a designated desk on the mezzanine floor of the library, but
not to use the desks in the regular reading room; and to sit at a designated table
and to eat at a different time from the other students in the school cafeteria.3 1
As the litigation was pending, the university altered the conditions in an
attempt to comply with Separate-But-Equal in the following manner:
For some time, the section of the classroom in which appellant sat was
surrounded by a rail on which there was a sign stating, "Reserved For Colored,"
but these have been removed. He is now assigned to a seat in the classroom in
a row specified for colored students; he is assigned to a table in the library on
the main floor; and he is permitted to eat at the same time in the cafeteria as
other students, although here again he is assigned to a special table. 32
Although McLaurin was permitted to be physically present on campus, in
order to comply with state law, he was not allowed to interact with any of his
classmates in academic or social spaces.33 The Supreme Court held that these
conditions were constitutionally invalid.34 McLaurin showed the University of
Oklahoma, and American society as a whole, that separate was not equal and he
2 7 Id
28 1d at 352.
29 McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 638-39 (1950).
30 Id at 640.
3 1 Id
32Id
33Id at 641 ("These restrictions were obviously imposed in order to comply, as nearly
as could be, with the statutory requirements of Oklahoma. But they signify that the State, in
administering the facilities it affords for professional and graduate study, sets McLaurin apart
from the other students. The result is that appellant is handicapped in his pursuit of effective
graduate instruction. Such restrictions impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in
discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his
profession.").
34 Id at 642.
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was willing to fight for better educational opportunities. Ada Lois Sipuel,
another African American student, taught a similar lesson in her successful
lawsuit against the racially segregated University of Oklahoma School of Law.
35
In Sweatt v. Painter, African American student Heman Sweatt was refused
admission to the University of Texas Law School because of state laws that
banned racial integration in higher education.3 6 Instead, the state established a
separate law school for African American students where Sweatt refused to
enroll. 37 Sweatt brought a successful equal protection challenge based on the
egregious educational disparities between the two schools and was ordered
admittance to the University of Texas Law School. 38 Sweatt taught the
University of Texas Law School, and others, that separate was not equal and he
was willing to fight for both the tangible and intangible educational benefits that
were denied to him by Jim Crow laws.
In sum, the student plaintiffs in Gaines, McLaurin, Sipuel, and Sweatt had
much to teach both higher education and society in general. They achieved their
legal victories in the framework of Separate-But-Equal-they won because the
states were unable to show equal facilities.39 The final blow to Separate-But-
Equal would not happen until 1954 in Brown v. Board ofEducation.40
Even after Brown, however, a number of federal district courts continued to
hear challenges to the categorical exclusion of African Americans at American
colleges and universities. These cases are telling. In Lucy v. Adams, the
University of Alabama refused to admit Autherine Lucy because she was
African American. 4 1 The district court enjoined the university from refusing her
35 Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631, 632-33 (1948) (per curiam).36 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 631 n.1 (1950).
371d. at 632.
38 1d at 633-34 ("Whether the University of Texas Law School is compared with the
original or the new law school for Negroes, we cannot find substantial equality in the
educational opportunities offered white and Negro law students by the State. In terms of
number of the faculty, variety of courses and opportunity for specialization, size of the
student body, scope of the library, availability of law review and similar activities, the
University of Texas Law School is superior. What is more important, the University of Texas
Law School possesses to a far greater degree those qualities which are incapable of objective
measurement but which make for greatness in a law school. Such qualities, to name but a
few, include reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, position and
influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and prestige. It is difficult to
believe that one who had a free choice between these law schools would consider the
question close.").
39Note that none of these cases overruled Plessy.
4 0 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("We conclude that in the field of
public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal.").
41 Lucy v. Adams, 134 F. Supp. 235, 235 (N.D. Ala. 1955), aff'd, Adams v. Lucy, 228
F.2d 619 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 931 (1956). Note that Autherine Lucy was joined
in the case by Polly Anne Myers, another African American plaintiff, who was also denied
admission to the University of Alabama based on race. Id at 237-38.
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admission. 42 Despite the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirming the district
court ruling,43 obstacles to enrollment remained firmly in place." When
Autherine Lucy attempted to start her college student life, the University of
Alabama, claiming that it could not ensure Lucy's safety, suspended her after a
mob prevented her from attending classes. 4 5 This pattern repeated itself
throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, with some universities manufacturing
arbitrary hurdles for African American students that precluded their
enrollment.4 6 Nonetheless, the excluded students continued to fight for fairness
and inclusion, teaching colleges and universities that students could make a
difference.
Seven years after Brown, James Meredith, an African American student,
applied to the University of Mississippi in January 1961.47 The university
registrar rejected James Meredith's application claiming, among other things,
that he did not seek admission in good faith because he did not submit the
required certificates of good character from university alumni. 48 Meredith, not
being able to obtain such certificates from any member of the all-white alumni
body, instead submitted character affidavits from African Americans citizens of
Mississippi whom he knew. 49 He repeatedly wrote the registrar seeking
admission to the university. 50 After ignoring his numerous letters, the registrar
responded that Meredith's application was insufficient. 51 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals concluded:
42 Id at 239.
43 Adams v. Lucy, 228 F.2d 619, 620 (5th Cir. 1955).
4See GENE ROBERTS & HANK KLIBANOFF, THE RACE BEAT 128-38 (2006).
4 5 Id
4 6 See, e.g., Holmes v. Danner, 191 F. Supp. 394, 401-02 (M.D. Ga. 1961) ("After a
careful consideration of all of the evidence admitted at the trial, the court finds that, had
plaintiffs been white applicants for admission to the University of Georgia, both plaintiffs
would have been admitted to the University not later than the beginning of the Fall Quarter,
1960.").
4 7 Meredith v. Fair, 305 F.2d 343, 346 (5th Cir. 1962).
4 8 Id at 346-48.
49 1d at 346. Meredith wrote to the registrar,
I will not be able to furnish you with the names of six University Alumni because I am
a Negro and all graduates of the school are White. Further, I do not know any graduate
personally. However, as a substitute for this requirement, I am submitting certificates
regarding my moral character from Negro citizens of my State.
Id The failure to enroll any African American students was a common feature of many
historically white universities across the South. See, e.g., Holmes, 191 F. Supp. at 402 ("No
Negroes have ever been enrolled at the University of Georgia, and, prior to September 29,
1950, no Negro had ever applied for admission. At the time of the trial only four Negroes,
including plaintiffs, had made application for admission to the University, all on or since
September 29, 1950, none of whom has yet been admitted.").
50 Meredith, 305 F.2d at 346-47.
5 1Id at 347-48.
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Reading the 1350 pages in the record as a whole, we find that James
Meredith's application for transfer to the University of Mississippi was turned
down solely because he was a Negro. We see no valid, non-discriminatory
reason for the University's not accepting Meredith. Instead, we see a well-
defined pattern of delays and frustrations, part of a Fabian policy of worrying
the enemy into defeat while time worked for the defenders. 52
The court admitted him to the university. 53 However, it would take
President John F. Kennedy's mobilization and intervention of federal troops and
U.S. marshals to force the university to open its doors to him.54 Meredith, like
his student activist predecessors before him, taught his institution and the rest
of the country that students were willing to agitate with dogged persistence until
racial inclusion had been achieved.
In the wake of the Civil Rights Movement, colleges' and universities'
exclusionary tactics began to wane. Indeed, the late 1960s and 1970s ushered in
unprecedented levels of racial minority enrollment in American higher
education.55 John R. Thelin observes:
After the civil unrest associated with the assassination of Martin Luther King,
Jr., and other incidents that brought racial tensions to the fore, numerous
colleges and universities initiated measures to promote racial access and
diversity. And enrollment patterns for African Americans and other minority
groups indicated substantial change. 56
Student activism for racial equity, in addition to the general social unrest of
the late 1960s and 1970s, had a significant role in changing university
admissions policies.5 7 This student-led pressure for inclusion also created
curricular changes. As minority enrollments increased and students continued
to push for inclusion, colleges and universities began instituting ethnic studies
programs to institutionalize the study of minority communities and
52 1d at 361.
53 1d.
54 See CHARLES W. EAGLES, THE PRICE OF DEFIANCE: JAMES MEREDITH AND THE
INTEGRATION OF OLE MisS 340 (2009).
55 Eg., CHRISTOPHER J. LUCAS, AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 262 (2006) ("Black
enrollment as a percentage of total students attending colleges and universities nationwide
mounted steadily after the mid-sixties. By 1971, the figure stood at 8.4 percent; by 1977 it
had risen to 10.8 percent of the total college enrollment. Between 1967 and 1974, for
example, black enrollment in white institutions increased fully 160 percent, compared to a
34 percent increase in the black enrollment of traditionally black colleges and a 33 percent
increase in total enrollment. The greatest numerical growth in black enrollment occurred in
northern white colleges and universities.").
5 6 JOHN R. THELIN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 348 (2d ed. 2011).
57 See generally RHOADS, supra note 2 (tracing the evolution of student activists on
American campuses, seeking racial equity and inclusion).
2332018]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURAAL
perspectives.5 8 This was a turbulent process. Cornel West observes, "The
inclusion of African Americans, Latino/a Americans, Asian Americans, Native
Americans and American women into the culture of critical discourse yielded
intense intellectual polemics and inescapable ideological polarization that
focused principally on the exclusions, silences and blindnesses of male, WASP
cultural homogeneity." 59 Therefore, students' push for racial inclusion and
equity transformed from being only about physical inclusion to campus spaces
to increasing agitation for cross-racial respect and understanding. And it is in
this historical context that students today are continuing the fight.
A recent example of student activism for racial justice that sparked a wave
of related protests across the country occurred at the University of Missouri,
which took inspiration in the #BlackLivesMatter protests in Ferguson.6 0 In the
2014-2015 academic year, a series of student protests at the University of
Missouri resulted in the resignations of the president of the University of
Missouri System and the chancellor of the University of Missouri, Columbia
campus.6 1 The protests were primarily led by a student group named
"Concerned Student 1950."62 Concerned Student 1950 is a reference to the first
year that the University of Missouri admitted African American students. 63
Much of the protests focused on issues of racial justice on campus and in
society. For example, after being subject to racial slurs by people in the back of
5 8 See MIKAILA MARIEL LEMONIK ARTHUR, STUDENT ACTIVISM AND CURRICULAR
CHANGE IN HIGHER EDUCATION (2011) (analyzing how student activism helped bring about
Women's Studies, Asian American Studies, and LGBTQ Studies); FABIO ROJAS, FROM
BLACK POWER TO BLACK STUDIES: HOW A RADICAL SOCIAL MOVEMENT BECAME AN
ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE (2007) (analyzing the interplay of student activism and the emergence
of Black Studies); DAVID YAMANE, STUDENT MOVEMENTS FOR MULTICULTURALISM:
CHALLENGING THE CURRICULAR COLOR LINE IN HIGHER EDUCATION (2001) (analyzing how
student activism led to multicultural studies at the University of California, Berkeley and the
University of Wisconsin, Madison).
59 CORNEL WEST, THE CORNEL WEST READER 127 (1999).6 0 See John Eligon & Richard Pdrez-Peila, University ofMissouri Protests Spur a Day
of Change, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/1 1/10/us/university-
of-missouri-system-president-resigns.html?_r-o (on file with Ohio State Law Journal)
("Many of the students and faculty members who took part in demonstrations had also been
inspired by the protest movement sparked last year in Ferguson, a suburb of St. Louis, after
a white police officer there killed Michael Brown, an unarmed black man, and they were
experienced at using social media in organizing. They saw themselves as part of a continuum
of activism linking Ferguson, other deaths at the hands of police, protests on campuses
around the country and the Black Lives Matter movement.").
61 Michael Pearson, A Timeline of the University ofMissouri Protests, CNN (Nov. 10,
2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/09/us/missouri-protest-timeline/ [https://perma.cc/9HEU-
ZQAK]; Susan Svrluga, U Missouri President, Chancellor Resign over Handling ofRacial
Incidents, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpostcom/news/grade-point/wp/
2015/11/0 9/missouris-student-govenment-calls-for-university-presidents-removal/ [https-/perma.
cc/8TX8-EPBR].62 See Pearson, supra note 61.
63 Id
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a passing pickup truck, student body president Payton Head wrote a Facebook
post in which he stated, "For those of you who wonder why I'm always talking
about the importance of inclusion and respect, it's because I've experienced
moments like this multiple times at THIS university, making me not feel
included here." 64 This post went viral and led to a series of student rallies that
the students called "Racism Lives Here." 65 The students found the university
president's response to their grievances insufficient. 66
Concerned Student 1950 issued a number of demands, including an apology
from and resignation by the university president and a number of steps to
increase racial diversity and understanding on campus. 67 After more racial
turmoil, including an unknown vandal smearing feces in the shape of a swastika
on a wall in a dorm bathroom, an African American graduate student named
Jonathan Butler launched a hunger strike.68 He vowed not to eat until the
university president resigned. 69 Adding additional pressure to the university
president, African American football players at the university subsequently
announced that they would neither practice nor play until the president
resigned.7 0 These collective protests led to the resignations of both the
SId.
651d; see also Before Protests, University ofMissouri Saw Decades ofRacial Tension,
CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-missoufi-
protests-20151110-story.html [https://perma.cc/F5G5-Z59J?type=image] ("Head's social
media accounts of having racial slurs shouted at him from a passing pickup truck helped
spark a renewed protest movement at Missouri that culminated Monday with the resignation
of university system President Tim Wolfe. Hours later, the top administrator of the Columbia
campus, Chancellor R. Bowen Loftin, was forced out.").66 Pearson, supra note 61.
67 Megan Favignano, UMPresident to Meet with Student Protestors; Students Give List
ofDemands, COLUM. DAILY TRIB. (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.columbiatribune.com/d457c73
7-64b0-5dbl-b21d-11d07efl4917.html [https//permacc/ 4FUF-L4FF]; see also Rudi Keller,
Concerned Student 1950 Renews Demands as University of Missouri Curators Begin
Presidential Search, COLUM. DAILY TRm. (Feb. 25, 2016), http//www.columbiatribune.com/
article/20160225/News/302259884 [https://perma.ccl3FCP-Z4MA].
68 See Pearson, supra note 61.
69 Id
70Id; see also Marc Tracy & Ashley Southall, Black Football Players Lend Heft to
Protests at Missouri, N.Y. TIMEs (Nov. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/09/us/
missouri-football-players-boycott-in-protest-of-university-president.html? r (on file with Ohio
State Law Journal). In direct response to the athletes' protest, a Missouri lawmaker proposed
a bill that would terminate scholarships for student-athletes who refused to play for non-
health related reasons. Dennis Dodd, State Rep Blasts Mizzou, Players for Supporting Civil
Rights Protests, CBS SPORTS (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.cbssports.com/college-
football/news/state-rep-blasts-mizzou-players-for-supporting-civil-rights-protests/ [https://perma.
cc/68N4-SMVR]. The bill was quickly withdrawn. See A.J. Perez, Missouri Legislator
Withdraws Bill To Bar Student Athletes from Protests, USA TODAY (Dec. 16, 2015),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/ 2 015/12/16/missouri-legislator-rick-brattin-
withdraws-bill-bar-student-athlete-protests/77417410/ [https://perma.cc/ML2A-LA89].
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university president and chancellor of the Columbia campus. 7 1 Concerned
Student 1950 used Twitter to get its message out,72 and connected college
students around the country to push for racial equity and inclusion.73 Given this
71 See Svrluga, supra note 61. Some professors also supported the protests. A prominent
example is communications professor Melissa Click, who was fired for blocking ajournalist
from accessing a protest. Richard Pdrez-Pefia, University of Missouri Fires Melissa Click,
Who Tried To Block Journalist at Protest, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/26/us/university-of-missouri-firs-melissa-click-who-tred-to-
block-joumalist-at-protest.html (on file with Ohio State Law Journal). The American
Association of University Professors subsequently issued an investigative report finding that
Professor Click's academic freedom rights were violated by the university for firing her
without a faculty review. Colleen Flaherty, A Firing with Consequences, INSIDE HIGHER ED
(May 19, 2016), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/05/19/aaup-fmds-mizzou-
compromised-academic-freedom-terminating-melissa-click [https://perma.cc/7RC8-KQ42]
("The Board of Curators of the University of Missouri System violated academic freedom in
dismissing Melissa Click, a former assistant professor of communication studies at the
Columbia campus, according to a new investigatory report by the American Association of
University Professors. As a result, AAUP could vote to censure Mizzou's administration at
the association's upcoming meeting." (citations omitted)). After its investigation, the AAUP
placed the University of Missouri on its censure list. Colleen Flaherty, Censures for Mizzou,
Saint Rose, INSIDER HIGHER ED (June 20, 2016), https://www.insidehigheredcom/news/2016/
06 /2 0/aaup-votes-censure-two-institutions-alleged-violations-academic-freedom-and-calls
[https://perma.cc/MSM3-QSKU].
7 2 See ConcernedStudentl950 (@cs 1950), TwIrrER, https://twitter.com/cs 1950?lang-
en [https://perma.cc/YJ8Y-S6CW] (last updated Feb. 7, 2017); cf Scott Jaschik, Ultimatum on
King Day, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 21, 2014), https//www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/01I/
21/racial-tensions-grow-university-michigan [https://perma.cc/8U3Z-E6BZ] ("Last semester's
#BBUM Twitter protest attracted nationwide attention, as students used the hashtag to
describe their frustrations with 'being black at the University of Michigan.' Students
described hostile or ignorant comments as everyday events in their lives, along with the
reality that their numbers are small (not even 5 percent of the university's enrollment, though
the state has a black population of more than 14 percent). The Twitter protest spread to other
universities in the state, and Michigan officials said that they were 'listening' and
concerned." (citation omitted)).
73 See, e.g., Brandon Griggs, The Next Missouri? Ithaca College Students Stage
Walkout, CNN (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/1 1/1 1/us/ithaca-college-protest-
racism-campus/ [https://perma.cc/G9SY-VLPT] ("Emboldened by recent upheavals at the
University of Missouri, hundreds of Ithaca College students staged a walkout Wednesday to
demand the resignation of President Tom Rochon, who they claim has not responded
adequately to incidents of racism on campus."); Hartocollis & Bidgood, supra note 22 ("In
interviews, students say they have been inspired by the Black Lives Matter movement that
grew out of the fatal shooting of Michael Brown by the police in Ferguson, Mo. They say
the victory of protesting students and football players at the University of Missouri has
spurred them to demand that their universities provide a safe space for students of color.");
Teresa Watanabe & Larry Gordon, Claremont McKenna College Students Embrace a Lesson
in Activism, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-In-
students-claremont-mckenna-react-racial-tensions-20151113-story.html [https://perma.cc/
K2GC-MZQU] ("Experts said protests at [Claremont McKenna College] are part of a wider
trend that started with the Black Lives Matter movement and was brought to wide attention
at the University of Missouri, where the football team's threat to strike unless racism was
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context of increasing student activism for racial justice, what rights do students
have to engage in such protests? In the next Part, I outline the constitutional
contours of student academic freedom to highlight the inadequacy of such
freedom when based on the First Amendment.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD OF STUDENT ACADEMIC FREEDOM
Prior to 1961, courts refused to recognize students' rights because
universities were viewed as acting in loco parentis (in the place of a parent) in
relation to their students. 74 Universities and their professors were seen as akin
to parents who were given vast discretion in building the morals of their
students. 75
Writing about in loco parentis, William Blackstone observed that a parent
[M]ay also delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to the tutor
or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has such a portion
of the power of the parent committed to his charge, viz. that of restraint and
correction, as may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is
employed. 76
This concept was subsequently applied to American higher education. For
example, in his inaugural address as the first president of Johns Hopkins
University, Daniel Coit Gilman observed, "The college theoretically stands in
loco parentis; it does not afford a very wide scope; it gives a liberal and
substantial foundation on which the university instruction may be wisely
built." 77 If a legal dispute arose, many courts gave deference to the colleges and
universities in maintaining order and discipline among students-who.were
viewed as mere children.
One expression of the in loco parentis doctrine in court was Gott v. Berea
College, in which the Kentucky Supreme Court upheld a rule forbidding
addressed there led to the resignation of two top leaders."); Jenny Wilson, Yale Students
March To Protest Racism on Campus, HARTFORD COURANT (Nov. 9, 2015),
http://www.courant.com/education/hc-yale-racial-protest- 110-20151109-story.html
[https://perma.cc/LVU8-3TSM?type=image] ("The 'March of Resilience' followed two
weeks of protest at Yale, including an allegation that a fraternity turned a woman away from
a party because she was not white and a fierce debate over culturally insensitive Halloween
costumes. The Yale march was held hours after the president and the chancellor of the
University of Missouri stepped down amid a controversy over race relations.").
74Philip Lee, The Curious Life ofln Loco Parentis at American Universities, 8 HIGHER
EDUC. REv. 65, 66 (2011).
75 Id at 69-70.
761 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: A FACSIMILE
OF THE FIRST EDITION OF 1765-1769, at 441 (University of Chicago Press 1979).
77 Gilman's Inaugural Address, JOHNS HOPKINS U., https://www.jhu.edu/about/history/
gilman-address/ [https://perma.cc/L5A7-AZBL] (emphasis added) (quoting Daniel Coit
Gilman's inaugural address as first president of Johns Hopkins University on February 22,
1876).
2372018]1
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
students from entering "[e]ating houses and places of amusement in Berea, not
controlled by the college."7 8 Berea College, a private institution in Kentucky,
expelled some students for violating this rule because the students ate at a
private restaurant not controlled by the college. 79 The restaurant owner
challenged the rule as unlawfully harming his business.80 The court upheld the
rule, reasoning:
College authorities stand in loco parentis concerning the physical and
moral welfare and mental training of the pupils, and we are unable to see why,
to that end, they may not make any rule or regulation for the government or
betterment of their pupils that a parent could for the same purpose. Whether
the rules or regulations are wise or their aims worthy is a matter left solely to
the discretion of the authorities or parents, as the case may be, and, in the
exercise of that discretion, the courts are not disposed to interfere, unless the
rules and aims are unlawful or against public policy. 81
In another case, John B. Stetson University v. Hunt, the Florida Supreme
Court upheld Stetson University's summary suspension of a female student for
"offensive habits that interfere with the comforts of others." 82 The university
claimed that the student was guilty of ringing cow bells, parading the halls of
the dormitory at forbidden hours, and turning off the lights without
permission.83 The court, in upholding the suspension, reasoned:
As to mental training, moral and physical discipline, and welfare of the
pupils, college authorities stand in loco parentis and in their discretion may
make any regulation for their government which a parent could make for the
same purpose, and so long as such regulations do not violate divine or human
law, courts have no more authority to interfere than they have to control the
domestic discipline of a father in his family. 84
In a similar case at a state institution, Syracuse University expelled a student
based on rumors that she was a troublemaker and that she was not "a typical
Syracuse girl."8 5 This student was dismissed without any notification of the
78 Gott v. Berea Coll., 161 S.W. 204, 205 (Ky. 1913).
79 Id
80 Id
8 11d at 206.
82 John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 102 So. 637, 640 (Fla. 1924).83 Id at 639.
84 Id at 640.
85 Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 231 N.Y.S. 435, 437 (N.Y. App. Div. 1928). Note that
if this type of case occurred in New York today, two additional state-specific legal wrinkles
would need to be addressed. First, the distinction between state and private universities may
be murky due to a statute that authorizes private colleges and universities to contract with
the state to provide educational services on behalf of the state. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 350(3)
(McKinney 2009). This threshold inquiry is important because depending on whether the
entity is deemed public or private, different legal standards would be applicable. For
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charges against her or opportunity for a hearing. 86 The New York Appellate
Division, consistent with the in loco parentis doctrine, observed:
The university may only dismiss a student for reasons falling within two classes
[set forth in the registration card that a student would have to sign before
enrolling], one, in connection with safeguarding the University's ideals of
scholarship, and the other in connection with safeguarding the University's
moral atmosphere. When dismissing a student, no reason for dismissing need
be given. 87
In sum, during the heyday of in loco parentis, courts gave great deference
to colleges and universities-both public and private-to shape the morals of
their students.
The in loco parentis relationship at American colleges and universities
changed after Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education.8 8 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held in Dixon that students who were expelled from a state
college for engaging in protests against racial segregation at the local courthouse
were entitled to due process protection. 89 This case was to be the beginning of
the end for in loco parentis at American colleges and universities. 90
Courts from the early 1960s began to recognize the constitutional rights of
students at public universities. 9 1 Even though students' rights have been
example, the First Amendment only restricts state action. Second, a statutory mechanism
called Article 78 exists in New York that allows challenges to "arbitrary and capricious"
decision-making. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 7801-06 (McKinney 2008). Article 78 challenges
apply to private colleges and universities. See, e.g., Gertler v. Goodgold, 487 N.Y.S.2d 565,
569-70 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) ("[H]aving accepted a state charter and being subject to the
broad policy-making jurisdiction of the Regents of the University of the State of New York,
a single corporate entity of which they are deemed a part, private colleges and universities
are accountable in a CPLR Article 78 proceeding, with its well-defined standards ofjudicial
review, for the proper discharge of their self-imposed as well as statutory obligations."
(citations omitted)).86 Anthony, 231 N.Y.S. at 437.
87 Id at 440.
88 Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).89 Id at 158-59.
90 See Peter F. Lake, The Rise of Duty and the Fall of In Loco Parentis and Other
Protective Tort Doctrines in Higher Education Law, 64 MO. L. REv. 1, 9 (1999) ("The 1961
decision of the Fifth Circuit in Dixon v. Alabama marked the beginning of the end for in loco
parentis as an immunity insularizing the public (and later, indirectly, the private) college."
(footnote omitted)).
91 See, e.g, Marzette v. McPhee, 294 F. Supp. 562, 562 (W.D. Wis. 1968) (applying
constitutional due process rights to state university students); Dickey v. Ala. State Bd. of
Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613, 613-14 (M.D. Ala. 1967) (applying First Amendment principles to
state college students), vacated, Troy State Univ. v. Dickey, 402 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1969);
Hammond v. S.C. State Coll., 272 F. Supp. 947, 947 (D.S.C. 1967) (same); Knight v. State
Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174, 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961) (applying Fourteenth Amendment
due process analysis to public university students).
2392018]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
protected since Dixon,92 legal scholars disagree as to whether student academic
freedom based on constitutional law exists. On the one hand, J. Peter Byrne
argues that "no recognized student rights of free speech are properly part of
constitutional academic freedom, because none of them has anything to do with
scholarship or systematic learning." 93 Byrne assumes that academic freedom is
only about scholarship and systematic learning and that students do not
contribute to either. He contends that "while the Constitution affords students at
public institutions extensive civil rights, it affords them no rights of academic
freedom at all." 94 On the other hand, Walter Metzger has a broader view of
academic freedom and explores the symbiotic interplay between faculty
freedom and student freedom. 9 5 He argues that "if the student bid for freedom
were excluded, a major part of the constitutional story of academic freedom
would go untold."96 Metzger continues:
Even if they did not stand as full equals before the law, teachers and students
did enter into complex relationships, adversarial and symbiotic, that affected
the kinds of freedom they could wrest from one another and from common
opponents in a court of law.... In the end, it seems best to conclude that, in
the academic freedom club, students qualify as special members. They form a
kind of odd group in-"odd" because they are neither fish nor fowl, neither
full-fledged citizens of the prime state nor contractual employees of the agent
state; "in" because to keep them out would be anomalous and impoverishing. 97
Metzger sought to highlight the complex interplay between faculty freedom
and student freedom-sometimes converging and other times diverging-but
nonetheless, always existing together. Consistent with Metzger's more nuanced
view of student academic freedom, a number of court cases suggest, and even
explicitly reference, academic freedom protection for students at public colleges
92Note that Dixon only applied to students at public universities. In this regard, Brian
Jackson observes:
Dixon v. Alabama often is hailed as a pivotal rejection of the in loco parentis
doctrine. But despite the Dixon decision, thousands of students at private
universities remain outside the scope of constitutional protection... . As a result,
actions by these schools cannot be attributed to the state for constitutional purposes.
The Dixon decision thus left untouched thousands of students attending private
colleges and universities. These students have no substantive or procedural
constitutional safeguards.
Brian Jackson, Note, The Lingering Legacy of In Loco Parentis: An Historical Survey and
Proposal for Reform, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1135, 1153-54 (1991) (footnotes omitted).93 J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment,"
99 YALE L.J. 251, 262 (1989).
94 Id. at 263.
95 Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic
Freedom in America, 66 TEx. L. REv. 1265, 1305 (1988).
96 I
97 d
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and universities. Although none of these cases deal explicitly with student
activism, they all recognize that the special context of higher education creates
heightened constitutional protections for students.
The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that students at public
colleges and universities have certain rights based on their status as higher
education students in conjunction with First Amendment principles. For
example, in 1957, the Court held in Sweezy v. New Hampshire that a state
investigation of a visiting lecturer at the University of New Hampshire, who was
claimed to be a "subversive person"98 for his classroom speech and political
associations, was a violation of his due process and free association rights.9
The Court noted, "We believe that there unquestionably was an invasion of
petitioner's liberties in the areas of academic freedom and political expression-
areas in which government should be extremely reticent to tread."100 The Court
further observed, "Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to
study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our
civilization will stagnate and die."' 0 '
In 1964, the Court decided Baggett v. Bullitt, a case in which professors,
staff members, and students from the University of Washington challenged a
state-mandated loyalty oath on First Amendment grounds.1 02 The Court held
that the oath requirement was unconstitutionally vague.1 03 In a footnote, the
Court recognized the students' interest in academic freedom in this case by
noting:
Since the ground we find dispositive immediately affects the professors and
other state employees required to take the oath, and the interests ofthe students
at the University in academic freedom are fully protected by a judgment in
favor of the teaching personnel, we have no occasion to pass on the standing
of the students to bring this suit.1 04
Eight years later, in Healy v. James, the Court held that Central Connecticut
State College's refusal to recognize a campus chapter of Students for a
Democratic Society as an official student organization was a violation of the
students' First Amendment rights.' 05 The Court, in ruling for the students,
reasoned, "The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the
'marketplace of ideas,' and we break no new constitutional ground in
reaffirming this Nation's dedication to safeguarding academic freedom." 106 it
noted:
9 8 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 246 & n. 11 (1957).
9 91d. at 254-55.
100Id at 250.
101 Id (emphasis added).
102 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 360 (1964).
103Id at 369-72.
1041d. at 366 n.5 (emphasis added).
105 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 169 (1972).
106Id at 180-81.
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[T]he precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, because of the
acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections should apply with
less force on college campuses than in the community at large. Quite to the
contrary, "the vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more
vital than in the community of American schools."1 07
In 1995, the Court in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of
Virginia held that the University of Virginia's denial of funding to a student-run
Christian magazine, while secular student-run magazines received funding,
amounted to unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. 0 8 In so holding, the
Court observed:
The quality and creative power of student intellectual life to this day remains a
vital measure of a school's influence and attainment. For the University, by
regulation, to cast disapproval on particular viewpoints of its students risks the
suppression of free speech and creative inquiry in one of the vital centers for
the Nation's intellectual life, its college and university campuses. 10 9
In other words, the Court was recognizing the special context of higher
education, which called for heightened speech protections. However, when
applying legal protections to students' expression, a number of tensions have
arisen between students and both their institutions and their professors.
A. Tension Between Academic Freedom ofStudents and Institutions
The elements of institutional academic freedom were first set forth by
Justice Felix Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sweezy.1"0 In that opinion,
Justice Frankfurter defined the four essential freedoms of a university "to
determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught,
how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study."' These four
freedoms would become foundational pillars in later cases discussing an
institution's academic freedom rights vis-A-vis students' rights.
Many of these disputes have arisen out of conflicts between students and
university administrators or faculty members who are acting on behalf of the
institution. For example, in Regents ofthe University ofMichigan v. Ewing, the
Court upheld a medical school's academic dismissal of a student.1 12 The
medical school refused to allow the student to retake a test after that student
failed it.1 13 Citing Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sweezy, the Court
107Id at 180 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)).108 Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 832 (1995).
109Id at 836.
110 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in
result).
IIIId1 12 Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 216 (1985).113 See id at 221-28.
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deferred to the educational judgment of the medical school to determine whether
a student should be dismissed for academic reasons. 114 The student's rights in
this situation were not part of the academic freedom analysis.
In 2000, the Court decided Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin
System v. Southworth.i1 5 In Southworth, a group of students challenged the
mandatory student activity fee that funded the operation of student
organizations. 116 The students argued that the fee violated their First
Amendment rights because they should have the choice not to fund student
organizations that engage in political expression that is offensive to their
personal beliefs. 117 The Court upheld the mandatory fee because it was
administered in a viewpoint-neutral manner.118 Of particular significance, in a
concurring opinion written by Justice Souter and joined by Justices Stevens and
Bryer, the Justices cited the law of academic freedom as a relevant source of
law in adjudicating this dispute.119 However, Souter's concurrence focused
exclusively on the university's right to decide how it "discharge[s] ... its
educational mission."120 Justice Souter further noted: "Our understanding of
academic freedom has included not merely liberty from restraints on thought,
expression, and association in the academy, but also the idea that universities
and schools should have the freedom to make decisions about how and what to
teach."l21As in Ewing, student rights were not mentioned at all in this academic
freedom analysis.
Similarly, in a case before a federal district court, Yacovelli v. Moeser, a
number of University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC) students brought
a Free Exercise Clause claim against the university to prevent it from assigning
a book during freshman orientation that contained a positive portrayal of
1141d at 225-26. In a footnote, the Court acknowledged the potential conflict between
institutional and professorial freedoms, noting: "Academic freedom thrives not only on the
independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students . . . but also,
and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decision[-]making by the academy itself . . . ."
Id at 226 n.12. This tension is highlighted in cases where professorial and institutional
interests diverge. See Philip Lee, A Contract Theory ofAcademic Freedom, 59 St. Louis U.
L.J. 461 (2015) (discussing the dominant constitutional analysis that academic freedom
protects academic institutions, but not individual professors).
115 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
116Id at 226-27.
117 Id at 227.
118Id at 234.
119Id at 236-37 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The question before us is
thus ... whether Southworth has a claim to relief from this specific viewpoint neutral
scheme. Two sources of law might be considered in answering this question. The first
comprises First Amendment and related cases grouped under the umbrella of academic
freedom. Such law might be implicated by the University's proffered rationale, that the grant
scheme funded by the student activity fee is an integral element in the discharge of its
educational mission." (footnotes omitted)).
120 Id at 237.
121 Bd ofRegents, 529 U.S. at 237.
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Islam. 122 The district court gave deference to the university's educational
judgment and dismissed the students' claim.1 23 The court observed, "UNC,
instead of endorsing a particular religious viewpoint, merely undertook to
engage students in a scholarly debate about a religious topic... . Students were
free to share their opinions on the topic whether their opinions be positive,
negative or neutral."1 24 Once again, the focus of the academic freedom analysis
was on the institution's right to select readings for the students with no attention
as to what rights students have in such situations.
Other higher education cases have applied another First Amendment case
that arose in a public school (K-12) context-Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier.12 5 For example, in a case decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, Brown v. Li,126 a student at the University of California at Santa
Barbara challenged the university's refusal to allow the student to include a
"disacknowledgements" section in his master's thesis as a violation of his First
Amendment rights. 12 7 This section stated, "I would like to offer special Fuck
You's to the following degenerates for being an ever-present hindrance during
my graduate career.. ." and identified a number of university administrators and
others that supposedly thwarted his academic progress.1 28 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, citing Hazelwood, found for the university, noting that the
"decision was reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical objective: teaching
Plaintiff the proper format for a scientific paper." 29 In addressing why
Hazelwood was the relevant standard, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
explained:
In view of a university's strong interest in setting the content of its
curriculum and teaching that content, Hazelwood provides a workable standard
for evaluating a university student's First Amendment claim stemming from
curricular speech. That standard balances a university's interest in academic
freedom and a student's First Amendment rights. It does not immunize the
12 2 Yacovelli v. Moeser, 324 F. Supp. 2d 760, 762 (M.D.N.C. 2004).
12 3 See id at 764.
124 Id
12 5 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). In addition, note that the
Supreme Court has referenced the Tinker "substantial disruption" test in a First Amendment
case involving students at a public college. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 190-91 (1972)
(observing that a state college's denial of recognition for a student organization violated the
First Amendment, in part, because there was no evidence that the organization would create
a substantial disruption). The Tinker "substantial disruption" test arose in a K-12 free speech
case and provides a framework in which a public school may legally restrict student speech.
See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (holding that a
public school may regulate student speech that "materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others"). In a future piece, I plan to analyze
why the Tinker test is inadequate to protect student academic freedom in higher education.
126 Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002).
127Id. at 943.
128 952
129 Id at 952.
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university altogether from First Amendment challenges but, at the same time,
appropriately defers to the university's expertise in defining academic
standards and teaching students to meet them. 130
Hazelwood involved a high school student's First Amendment challenge to
the removal of two articles in the school's newspaper.131 One of the articles
dealt with teen pregnancy and the other reported on the impact of divorce on
some of the students.1 32 The principal decided to remove the articles because he
was worried about the appropriateness of the subject matter to this high school
student audience and the confidentiality of the people mentioned in the
articles. 133 The Court, in upholding the school's actions, held "that educators do
not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style
and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities as long
as their actions were reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." 34
The Court recognized the relevance of the age of the young students in a K-12
setting by observing that:
[A] school must be able to take into account the emotional maturity of the
intended audience in determining whether to disseminate student speech on
potentially sensitive topics, which might range from the existence of Santa
Claus in an elementary school setting to the particulars of teenage sexual
activity in a high school setting. 135
However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' reliance on Hazelwood's
"legitimate pedagogical concerns" standard is misplaced. Specifically, First
Amendment principles arising from K-12 settings have been ill suited to protect
student academic freedom at American colleges and universities because they
fail to take into account the special context of American higher education.
Rather than effectively balancing all of the competing interests-between
institutions, students, and professors-Hazelwood only asks what pedagogical
interests-i.e., teaching-related interests-are at stake. This downplaying of
students' interests will be further apparent in conflicts between students and
their professors.
B. Tension Between Academic Freedom ofStudents and Professors
In many situations, academic freedom for both students and professors has
been aligned. For example, in Crue v. Aiken, the plaintiffs were "a loose group
of faculty members and a graduate teaching assistant," whose interests were
130Id. at 951-52.
131 Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 264 (1988).
1 32 1d. at 263.
133 See id
134Id at 273.13 5Id. at 272.
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aligned against the institution, the University of Illinois. 13 6 Pursuant to athletic
regulations, the university did not allow faculty or students to communicate with
prospective student athletes.1 37 The plaintiffs wanted to inform these
prospective students about their views on a current controversy regarding the
university's mascot named "Chief Illiniwek."l 38 The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on First Amendment grounds.1 39 In
another case, Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Supreme Court of
Louisiana, law students and student organizations along with professors
challenged a state supreme court rule that restricted the types of community
groups that may be represented and solicited by law school clinics.1 40 Although
the plaintiffs lost their case,141 their academic freedom rights were aligned in
their fight against the state.
However, sometimes tension exists between students' and professors'
academic freedom rights. Curricular decisions are a recent example. Courts have
recognized that professors' rights to decide the content of a class generally
supersede students' rights to do the same. 142 For example, in Axson-Flynn v.
Johnson, a student at the University of Utah's Actor Training Program, who
based on her religious beliefs, refused to take God's name in vain or use
particular offensive words during classroom exercises. 143 The faculty members
told her to "get over" her language issues and required her to read the words on
the scripts.'" She eventually left the acting program because she believed that
she would have been dismissed.1 45 The student challenged the university's
attempt to force her to use certain words as a violation of her First Amendment
rights. 146 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on the Hazelwood test,
noted that this was "school-sponsored speech," and as such, the university's
decision to compel that speech would be upheld as long as its decision was
"reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."l 47 The court remanded
1 3 6 Crue v. Aiken, 370 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 2004).
13 7 See id at 674-76.13 8 Id at 674.
139Id at 679-80.
140 S. Christian Leadership Conference v. Supreme Court of La., 252 F.3d 781, 787-88
(5th Cir. 2001).
141 See id. at 795 (affirming district court's judgment dismissing the action).
142 A similar principle applies in the K-12 setting. See, e.g., Settle v. Dickson Cty. Sch.
Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 155-56 (6th Cir. 1995) ("So long as the teacher limits speech or grades
speech in the classroom in the name of learning and not as a pretext for punishing the student
for her race, gender, economic class, religion or political persuasion, the federal courts
should not interfere.").
143 Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 2004).
144See id.
1 4 5 See id at 1283.
1 4 6 See id
147Id. at 1290 (quoting Fleming v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918, 926 (10th
Cir. 2002)).
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the case to determine whether the professors' treatment of the student was based
on pedagogical grounds or a pretext for religious discrimination.1 48
Similarly, in Head v. Board of Trustees of California State University, a
student in San Jose State University's teaching program, who disagreed with
multiculturalism, challenged the professors' incorporation of multiculturalism
in their classes as a violation of his First Amendment rights.1 49 The court, citing
to Hazelwood, found for the professors and held:
Public university instructors are not required by the First Amendment to
provide class time for students to voice views that contradict the material being
taught or interfere with instruction or the educational mission. Although the
First Amendment may require an instructor to allow students to express
opposing views and values to some extent where the instructor invites
expression of students' personal opinions and ideas, nothing in the First
Amendment prevents an instructor from refocusing classroom discussions and
limiting students' expression to effectively teach. 150
This court's First Amendment analysis centered on a professor's freedom
to teach. Student freedom was tangential to this interest.
As noted, both Axson-Flynn and Head employed Hazelwood' s "legitimate
pedagogical concerns" standard in higher education contexts. 151 However, this
approach applied to higher education is problematic in that it ignores any
interest the students may have in academic freedom. Specifically, Hazelwood
asks whether or not the institution or professor acted with a "legitimate
pedagogical concern" and stops there. What is missing is a multisided balancing
of interests. Taking into account the difference between K-12 and higher
education students, a number of questions arise regarding the Hazelwood test.
What about university and college students' interests-do they have any worth
considering? How can a legal standard take into account the unique context of
1481d at 1301.
149 Head v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ., No. H029129, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS
393, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2007).
1 50 1d at *36. The court also recognized the academic freedom of the institution to
incorporate multiculturalism into its curriculum:
We discern nothing in First Amendment jurisprudence that precludes a public university
from adopting, in its exercise of its academic freedom, academic standards that must be
satisfied by a student seeking a professional teaching credential even where those
standards reflect a certain philosophy of education or academic viewpoints with which
a student vehemently disagrees.
Id at *44-45.15 1 Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1289 ("[W]e hold that the Hazelwood framework is
applicable in a university setting for speech that occurs in a classroom as part of a class
curriculum."); Head, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 393, at *35 ("Student speech in school-
sponsored expressive activities may be restricted so long as the restrictions reasonably relate
to legitimate pedagogical concerns."); cf Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1074-77 (11th
Cir. 1991) (applying Hazelwood to faculty speech).
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American higher education in balancing the competing interests? How can this
standard be made applicable to both public and private institutions?
Given the differences between K-12 and higher education based on the
varying ages of the students and correspondingly different purposes,1 52 at least
one court has refused to apply Hazelwood to a university context. 153 In Kincaid
v. Gibson, Kentucky State University confiscated and banned the distribution of
a student-edited yearbook because university administrators felt the publication
to be of poor quality and inappropriate.1 54 The district court relied, in part, on
Hazelwood in holding for the university.1 55 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals, in reversing the district court, declined to follow Hazelwood, a case
it described as "a case that deals exclusively with the First Amendment rights
of students in a high school setting."' 56 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
noted, "The university environment is the quintessential 'marketplace of ideas,'
which merits full, or indeed heightened, First Amendment protection."' 5 7 The
court, thus, held for the students. 58
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was correct because it took into account
the differences between K-12 students and higher education students-which
are differences that have been acknowledged by the United States Supreme
Court in prior cases.1 59 In college and university settings, therefore, an
alternative standard than Hazelwood's "legitimate pedagogical concerns" test
should apply. One possible approach is suggested by Kincaid, in which the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals applied a traditional First Amendment doctrine-
forum analysis-but did so in the special context of higher education. Forum
analysis affords different levels of First Amendment protection depending on
152 Compare Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (identifying
"the objectives of public education [K-12] as the 'inculcat[ion of] fundamental values
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system"' (quoting Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979))), with Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967) ("The [university] classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas
which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of
authoritative selection."' (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372
(S.D.N.Y. 1943))).
15 3 See Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
I54Id at 345.
155 See id at 346.
156 Id
157 Id. at 352.
158 See id at357.
159 Compare Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683-84 (1986) ("By glorifying
male sexuality, and in its verbal content, the speech was acutely insulting to teenage girl
students. The speech could well be seriously damaging to its less mature audience, many of
whom were only 14 years old and on the threshold of awareness of human sexuality. Some
students were reported as bewildered by the speech and the reaction of mimicry it provoked."
(citations omitted)), with Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981) ("University
students, are, of course, young adults. They are less impressionable than younger
students . . . .").
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what type of forum was created by the state actor. The Supreme Court has
recognized three types of public fora: 1) the traditional public forum; 2) the
designated public forum; and 3) the nonpublic forum.1 60 First, the traditional
public forum is a place "which by long tradition or by government fiat ha[s]
been devoted to assembly and debate," such as a street, sidewalk, or park.161 In
a traditional public forum, "the rights of the State to limit expressive activity are
sharply circumscribed."l 62 The Supreme Court has held:
In these quintessential public forums, the government may not prohibit all
communicative activity. For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it
must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest
and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. The State may also enforce
regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression which are content-
neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and
leave open ample alternative channels of communication.
163
Second, the designated public forum is a location that "the state has opened
for use by the public as a place for expressive activity."l64 If a state has
designated such a place, "it is bound by the same standards as apply in a
traditional public forum."' 65 Third, the nonpublic forum is "[p]ublic property
which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication."l 6 6
It is a place in which the government can and does close to the public for
speech. 167 In a nonpublic forum, "[i]n addition to time, place, and manner
regulations, the State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes,
communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable
and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose
the speaker's view." 6 8
160 Some scholars have analyzed the existence of a fourth category of public fora, "the
limited public forum." See, e.g., Norman T. Deutsch, Does Anybody Really Need a Limited
Public Forum?, 82 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 107, 108 (2008) (noting how some courts have
acknowledged a limited public forum and detailing the problems with such a concept).
161 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44-46 (1983) ("At
one end of the spectrum are streets and parks which 'have immemorially been held in trust
for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions."' (quoting
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939))). Note that in Perry, forum
analysis was applied to a school mail system, which is not a physical location, but a
metaphysical one. Id at 46-47; see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995) ("The [Student Activities Fund] is a forum more in a metaphysical
[sense] than in a spatial or geographic sense, but the same principles are applicable.").
162 Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45.
1631d. (citations omitted).
164 Id
165Id. at 46.
166 P.y
1 67 Id.
168 Perry Educ. Ass 'n, 460 U.S. at 46.
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Out of these three categories, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Kincaid
found that the student yearbook was a designated public forum because the
university "intended to open the forum at issue."1 69 The court found that the
special context of higher education informed its decision on why the university
intended the yearbook to be a forum for public communication. 17 0 The court
observed:
The university is a special place for purposes of First Amendment
jurisprudence. The danger of "chilling ... individual thought and
expression ... is especially real in the University setting, where the State acts
against a background and tradition of thought and experiment that is at the
center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition."1 7 1
However, this contextual inquiry of what type of forum the university
intended focused entirely on the characteristics of the university, as an
institution. Student academic freedom, on the other hand, was not explicitly
mentioned.
The Supreme Court has also applied forum analysis to other types of student
expression cases within colleges and universities. For example, in Widmar v.
Vincent, the Court struck down the University of Missouri at Kansas City's
regulation that prohibited the use of campus facilities by religious student
groups as a violation of the students' First Amendment rights.1 72 In finding a
limited public forum, the Court noted, "Through its policy of accommodating
their meetings, the University has created a forum generally open for use by
student groups. Having done so, the University has assumed an obligation to
justify its discriminations and exclusions under applicable constitutional
norms."l 73 The Court found the University of Missouri's regulation
unconstitutional. 174 Even though the university regulation was struck down, the
Court acknowledged institutional academic freedom rights in observing:
Our holding in this case in no way undermines the capacity of the
University to establish reasonable time, place, and manner regulations. Nor do
we question the right of the University to make academic judgments as to how
best to allocate scarce resources or "to determine for itself on academic grounds
who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
admitted to study." Finally, we affirm the continuing validity of cases .. . that
recognize a university's right to exclude even First Amendment activities that
1 69 Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 348-49 (6th Cir. 2001). Note that the court uses
the terms "designated public forum" and "limited public forum" interchangeably in its
analysis. Id at 348.
1701d at 352.
171 Id (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835-
36 (1995)).
172 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981).
1 73 Id at 267.
174Id at 277.
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violate reasonable campus rules or substantially interfere with the opportunity
of other students to obtain an education. 175
The Court was making it clear that even though certain student interests
were protected against the university's policies in this case, institutional
academic freedom was not affected by this holding. As in Kincaid, no mention
was made of student academic freedom.
Decisions like Widmar and Kincaid are a better approach than Hazelwood,
because at least the former cases take into account the special context of higher
education. However, Widmar and Kincaid do not go far enough in recognizing
the role of students' rights in applying that context to the constitutional
standards. Instead these cases narrow their contextual analysis to the rights of
institutions and faculty members, with little to no consideration of students'
rights. This makes student academic freedom based on First Amendment
principles insufficient.
An additional limitation of First Amendment doctrines in protecting student
academic freedom is that this protection only applies to students at public
universities. 17 6 Thus, constitutional protections are not available at private
institutions.
What remains after these limitations is that the constitutional standard for
student academic freedom is incomplete protection for students at public
universities and no protection for students at private institutions. In the next Part,
I turn to contract law for an alternative mechanism for protecting student
academic freedom at both public and private universities.
IV. TOWARD A NEW CONTRACT STANDARD OF
STUDENT ACADEMIC FREEDOM
A. Contract Law as an Alternative Foundation
Many colleges and universities explain the rights and obligations of their
students as part of their college catalogs, student handbooks, institutional rules,
and other sources. Some courts will interpret such documents as creating
contractual obligations.1 77 For example, in Stahis v. University of Kentucky, a
1 751d. at 276-77 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result)).176 The text of the First Amendment includes a state action requirement: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONsT. amend.
I.
177 See, e.g., Nungesser v. Columbia Univ., 169 F. Supp. 3d 353, 369-70 (S.D.N.Y.
2016) ("When a student is admitted to a university, an implied contract arises between the
parties which states that if the student complies with the terms prescribed by the university,
he will obtain the degree he seeks. The rights and obligations of the parties as contained in
the university's bulletins, circulars and regulations made available to the student, become a
2512018]1
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
case involving a student who challenged his expulsion from a state medical
school on breach of contract grounds, a Kentucky appellate court noted:
Our Supreme Court has noted that the relationship between a private
college and its students can be characterized as contractual in nature. We can
discern no reason why the same rule cannot be applied to public universities,
and are of the opinion that indeed an implied contract existed between [the
student] and the University and/or College of Medicine in this case. 178
As to the source of the obligations, the court recognized: "The rights and
obligations of the parties as contained in the University's bulletins, circulars and
regulations made available to the student become a part of the implied
contract."1 79
Similarly, in Corso v. Creighton University, an expelled medical school
student, Salvatore Corso, sued the school for breach of contract for failure to
part of this contract." (quoting Vought v. Teachers Coll., Columbia Univ., 511 N.Y.S.2d
880, 881 (1987))); Doe v. Brown Univ., 166 F. Supp. 3d 177, 191 (D.R.I. 2016) ("Under
Rhode Island law, '[a] student's relationship to his university is based in contract. The
relevant terms of the contractual relationship between a student and a university typically
include language found in the university's student handbook.' Rhode Island courts 'interpret
such contractual terms in accordance with the parties' reasonable expectations, giving those
terms the meaning that the university reasonably should expect the student to take from
them."' (quoting Havlik v. Johnson & Wales Univ., 509 F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir. 2007)));
Buescher v. Baldwin Wallace Univ., 86 F. Supp. 3d 789, 797-98 (N.D. Ohio 2015) ("[T]he
long-standing principle that when a student enrolls in a college or university, pays his or her
tuition and fees, and attends such school, the resulting relationship may reasonably be
construed as being contractual in nature. The terms of such contract are found in the college
catalog and handbook supplied to students." (quoting Jefferson v. Univ. of Toledo, No.
12AP-236, 2012 WL 4883203, at T 15 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2012))); Wagner v.
Holtzapple, 101 F. Supp. 3d 462, 487 (M.D. Pa. 2015) ("Pennsylvania law has clarified that
'the relationship between a private educational institution and an enrolled student is
contractual in nature; therefore, a student can bring a cause of action against said institution
for breach of contract where the institution ignores or violates portions of the written
contract.' This contract is embodied by the written guidelines, policies, and procedures as
contained in the written materials distributed to the student over the course of their
enrollment in the institution, including the student handbook." (quoting Swartley v. Hoffner,
734 A.2d 915, 919 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999))); Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
at 2, Barnes v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga. Sys., No. 2012CV212942, 2012 WL
9506256 (Ga. Super. Ct. July 23, 2012) ("The Court finds the [student code of conduct]
demonstrates an intent to enter into a binding agreement."), rev 'd sub nom. Bd. of Regents
of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. Barnes, 743 S.E.2d 609 (2013). But see Lucero v. Curators of the
Univ. of Mo., 400 S.W.3d 1, 4-5 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) ("While other jurisdictions have found
a contractual relationship exists between a student and a university . .. the parties have not
cited, nor has our research uncovered, any case law in Missouri that expressly finds the
existence of a contractual relationship between a student and a university." (citations
omitted)).
178 Stathis v. Univ. of Ky., No. 2004-CA-000556-MR, 2005 WL 1125240, at *9 (Ky.
Ct. App. May 13, 2005) (citations omitted).
179 Id.
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follow the procedure set forth in the student handbook. 8 0 The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals observed:
The relationship between a university and a student is contractual in
nature. In order to establish his claim, Corso must prove that the University
breached a contractual right. For our purposes, the Creighton University
Handbook for Students 1981-82 [Student Handbook] is the primary source of
the terms governing the parties' contractual relationship. 18 1
In Ross v. Creighton University, a case involving a breach of contract claim
by a college basketball player who alleged that he was denied any meaningful
access to the academic curriculum, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted
that "the 'basic legal relation between a student and a private university or
college is contractual in nature. The catalogues, bulletins, circulars, and
regulations of the institution made available to the matriculant become a part of
the contract."'1 8
2
In a Texas case involving a student's dispute with a public nursing school,
the student claimed that the school breached its contract by forcing her to
withdraw from the program based on different requirements than was contained
in the university catalog at the time of her enrollment.1 83 The Texas appellate
court wrote, "We hold that a school's catalog constitutes a written contract
between the educational institution and the patron, where entrance is had under
its terms."1 84 The Court of Appeals of Texas later distinguished this case from
a dispute involving a student who was expelled for failing a required course.1 85
The court held that "[iun light of the express disclaimer in the [school catalog],
no enforceable contract existed in the present case." 186 This holding suggests
that all a college or university needs to do to avoid contractual obligations is
insert disclaimers into its written materials. Indeed, some commentators
advocate that schools follow this practice to avoid contractual liability.1 87
180 Corso v. Creighton Univ., 731 F.2d 529, 530 (8th Cir. 1984).
181 Id at 531 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
1 82 Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 416 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting Zumbrun v.
Univ. of S. Cal., 101 Cal. Rptr. 499, 504 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972)). Courts have also held that
faculty handbooks and other documents could similarly be deemed as contracts between
professors and their institutions. See, e.g., Sola v. Lafayette Coll., 804 F.2d 40, 45 (3d Cir.
1986) (treating the language in faculty handbook with a contractual status); Arneson v. Bd.
of Trs., McKendree Coll., 569 N.E.2d 252, 256-57 (111. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that
language in faculty handbook was legally binding); Brady v. Bd. of Trs., 242 N.W.2d 616,
619 (Neb. 1976) (holding that faculty employment letter and institutional bylaws were
contractual).
183 Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. v. Babb, 646 S.W.2d 502, 504 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
1841d at 506.
185 Tobias v. Univ. of Tex., 824 S.W.2d 201, 211 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
1861d
187 Eg., Sara Kupferer et al., Student Handbooks: Are They Legally Binding Contracts?,
13 CAMPUS SAFETY & STUDENT DEV. 11, 11 (2011) ("Good practice tips when writing an
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However, some courts will interpret these documents in accordance with
the unique context of higher education. For example, in a case involving
professors claiming breach of contract, five nontenured faculty members were
summarily terminated for their involvement in campus protests.' 88 The faculty
members argued "that the University failed in its obligation, incident to their
contracts, to give the appropriate advance notice of non-renewal."1 89 The
university argued that a disclaimer in the handbook negated any contractual
obligations arising from this document. 190 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected the disclaimer, observing:
Contracts are written, and are to be read, by reference to the norms of conduct
and expectations founded upon them. This is especially true of contracts in and
among a community of scholars, which is what a university is. The readings of
the market place are not invariably apt in this non-commercial context.19 1
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found in favor of the professors, noting
that the faculty handbook gave the professors a contractual right to reasonable
notice and an opportunity to be heard.1 92
Other courts, in disputes regarding students' rights, have nullified
disclaimers contained in college catalogs based on unconscionability. For
example, in Gamble v. University System ofNew Hampshire, a student brought
a breach of contract claim against a public university for arbitrarily raising
tuition after the registration deadline.1 9 3 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire
found that the disclaimer contained in the catalog was unconscionable.1 94 The
court observed, "It is inconceivable that the University could retain carte
blanche authority to raise the tuition at any time during the semester for any
amount it deems appropriate." 95 Finally, some courts will refuse to find explicit
contracts based on disclaimers, but nonetheless, find obligations based on
implicit agreements. For example, in Southwell v. University of the Incarnate
Word, a nursing school student brought a breach of contract action against the
school after she failed a required course and was not able to receive her degree
as she planned.1 96 A Texas appellate court found that while a disclaimer in the
university bulletin was effective in negating an express contract, an implied
contract nonetheless existed.1 9 7 The court observed, "The specific terms of such
institution's student handbook encourage the inclusion of a disclaimer stating that the
handbook is not a legally binding contract between the student and the institution.").
188 Greene v. Howard Univ., 412 F.2d 1128, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
189Id. at 1132.
1901d at 1134.
191Id at 1135.
192 jd19 3 Gamble v. Univ. Sys. of N.H., 610 A.2d 357, 359 (N.H. 1992).
194Id at 361.
19 5 d
1 9 6 Southwell v. Univ. of the Incarnate Word, 974 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998).
197Id. at 356.
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a contract must logically be defined by the college or university's policies and
requirements." 98 As these cases suggest, some courts will find ways to find
binding obligations between students and their institutions, even when
disclaimers are in place. This approach is better than finding that a college or
university is bound by no contractual obligations at all.
In the next Part, I address the question of what contractually-based academic
freedom should entail. Specifically, I turn to the ways in which the American
Association of University Professors has defined student academic freedom to
elucidate how colleges and universities should conceptualize student academic
freedom in their contracts with their students.
B. American Association of University Professors' Standard of
Academic Freedom
When the terms of a higher education agreement are ambiguous, some
courts turn to policy statements issued by the American Association of
University Professors (AAUP) to determine the reasonable expectation of the
parties. For example, in Browzin v. Catholic University ofAmerica, a professor
of engineering was terminated due to the university claiming conditions of
"financial exigency."'9 The parties agreed that the 1968 AAUP regulations
were incorporated by the employment contract between the professor and
university.2 00 In resolving this dispute in favor of the university, the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals relied on a number of AAUP materials outside the 1968
regulations to interpret the agreement, observing:
Those materials include statements widely circulated and widely accepted by
a large number of organizations involved in higher education (such as the 1925
Conference Statement and the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic
Freedom and Tenure), as well as guidelines and reports issued by the AAUP
as a result of its investigations into incidents where principles of academic
freedom or tenure have allegedly been violated... .As to the former
documents-the widely accepted statements--the propriety of our considering
them in interpreting the contract here could hardly be questioned. They form a
kind of legislative history for the 1968 Regulations, and they do represent
widely shared norms within the academic community, having achieved
acceptance by organizations which represent teachers as well as organizations
which represent college administrators and governing boards. 2 0 1
198 Id
199Browzin v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 527 F.2d 843, 845 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
200 Id
201 Id at 847 n.8. However, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals noted that "[t]he propriety
of considering the latter category-the AAUP's guidelines and reports--however, is more
problematic. Although the AAUP's investigations are noted for their thoroughness and
scrupulous care, the reports remain the product of an organization composed of professors
alone." Id The court noted that due to the professor's failure to establish a prima facie case
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As such, these documents can inform the ways in which the courts interpret
contractual obligations between students and their colleges. Instead of waiting
for legal disputes over vague terms, however, I propose that contracting parties
explicitly codify student-related AAUP policies in their handbooks and
institutional rules. In what follows, I briefly outline some of the major policy
statements that the AAUP has formulated that relate to student academic
freedom.
In 1915, the AAUP set forth its first policy statement on academic freedom
titled the General Report ofthe Committee on Academic Freedom andAcademic
Tenure (1915 Declaration). 202 The 1915 Declaration recognized two traditional
applications of academic freedom arising from the German model of higher
education: "to the freedom of the teacher and to that of the student, Lehrfreiheit
[to teach] and Lernfreiheit [to learn]." 203 However, the declaration's focus was
almost exclusively on the teacher. 204 While remaining mostly silent on the
student's freedom, it provided that professorial freedom entailed freedom of
scholarly research and inquiry, classroom teaching, and speech and conduct
outside the classroom. 205 Of note, there were limits to professorial freedom in
relation to the students' right to learn.206 For example, when teaching about
"controversial matters," the professor was required to:
[B]e a person of fair and judicial mind ... he should cause his students to
become familiar with the best published expressions of the great historic types
of doctrine upon the questions at issue; and he should, above all, remember that
his business is not to provide his students with ready-made conclusions, but to
train them to think for themselves, and to provide them access to those
materials which they need if they are to think intelligently.20 7
This limitation on professorial freedom evinced the AAUP's view that
higher education, at its best, was the enabling of students to think critically and
not forcing students to blindly accept dogmatic conclusions set forth by
professors.208
of contract breach based on the AAUP statement alone, it would not have to "delve more
deeply into the applicability of the AAUP guidelines and reports." Id.
202 Edwin R.A. Seligman et al., General Report ofthe Committee on Academic Freedom
and Academic Tenure: Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association, 1 BULL. AM.
Ass'N U. PROFESSORS 15 (1915) [hereinafter 1915 Declaration].
203 Id. at 20.
204 1d ("It need scarcely be pointed out that the freedom which is the subject of this
report is that of the teacher.").
205 Id
206 Id. at 33.
207Id. at 33-34.
2 08 See 1915 Declaration, supra note 202, at 35 ("The teacher ought also to be especially
on his guard against taking unfair advantage of the student's immaturity by indoctrinating
him with the teacher's own opinions before the student has had an opportunity fairly to
examine other opinions upon the matters in question, and before he has sufficient knowledge
and ripeness ofjudgment to be entitled to form any definitive opinion of his own.").
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The AAUP further defined the contours of academic freedom in 1940, in a
statement drafted together with the American Association of Colleges, titled the
Statement of Principles Concerning Academic Freedom and Tenure (1940
Statement).209 The 1940 Statement explained the purposes of tenure and
explicated the details of professorial freedom set forth in the 1915
Declaration. 210 It also defined some limits on professorial academic freedom,
once again in relation to the students' right to learn. For example, the statement
noted that "teacher[s] [are] entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing
[their] subject, but [they] should be careful not to introduce into [their] teaching
controversial matter which has no relation to [their] subject." 211 American
higher education historian, Christopher J. Lucas, writes about the 1940
Statement: "In time, most colleges and universities accepted its broad outlines,
and were reluctant to be found in noncompliance with its strictures." 212 Similar
to the 1915 Declaration, the 1940 Statement remained mostly silent as to student
freedom.
It was not until 1967 that the AAUP, in collaboration with several other
higher education organizations, set forth a policy statement that specifically
focused on student academic freedom titled the Joint Statement on Rights and
Freedoms ofStudents (1967 Joint Statement).213 The 1967 Joint Statement was
written in a time of student revolt and activism on college and university
campuses across the country. It was in the wake of the civil rights movement214
and the beginning of the Black Power movement.215 It was around the same
209 Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors & Ass'n of Am. Coils., Academic Freedom and
Tenure: Statement ofPrinciples, 1940, 27 BULL. AM. ASS'N U. PROFESSORS 40, 40 (1941).
210Id. at 40-41.
2 11 1d at 41. An interpretive comment clarifying this language was issued in 1970 that
provided:
The intent of this statement is not to discourage what is "controversial." Controversy is
at the heart of the free academic inquiry which the entire statement is designed to foster.
The passage serves to underscore the need for teachers to avoid persistently intruding
material which has no relation to [their] subject.
See Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors & Ass'n of Am. Coils., Academic Freedom and
Tenure: 1940 Statement ofPrinciples and Interpretive Comments, 56 AAUP BULL. 323,
325(1970).
2 12 LUCAS, supra note 55, at 208. While most higher education institutions formally or
informally adopted the 1940 Statement, I argue that colleges and universities should also
adopt AAUP policies that specifically outline student academic freedom.
2 13 Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms ofStudents,
53 AAUP BULL. 365 (1967) [hereinafter 1967 Joint Statement].
2 14 For a discussion of the civil rights movement, see generally BRUCE J. DIERENFIELD,
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (rev. ed. 2008); FREE AT LAST: A HISTORY OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THOSE WHO DIED IN THE STRUGGLE (Sara Bullard ed., 1989); FROM
SIT-INS TO SNCC: THE STUDENT CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE 1960s (Iwan Morgan &
Philip Davies eds., 2012).
215 For a discussion of the Black Power movement, see generally MARTHA BIONDI, THE
BLACK REVOLUTION ON CAMPUS (2012); IBRAM H. ROGERS, THE BLACK CAMPUS
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time as the Free Speech Movement at the University of California at Berkeley2 16
and the inception of the student-led movement against the Vietnam War.2 17 This
was the time where student activists, en masse, were protesting on and off
campuses in order to push for social change.
The purpose of the 1967 Joint Statement was "to enumerate the essential
provisions for student freedom to learn." 2 18 Specifically, it outlined the
academic freedom rights of students both inside and outside the classroom.
Inside the classroom, the statement urged that "[t]he professor in the
classroom ... should encourage free discussion, inquiry, and expression," and
that "[s]tudent performance should be evaluated solely on an academic basis,
not on opinions or conduct in matters unrelated to academic standards." 219 The
statement acknowledged, "Students should be free to take reasoned exception
to the data or views offered in any course of study and to reserve judgment about
matters of opinion, but they are responsible for learning the content of any
course of study for which they are enrolled." 22 0
The 1967 Joint Statement also provided guidance outside the classroom,
particularly as it related to students' freedom of association.22 1 It declared,
"Students bring to the campus a variety of interests previously acquired and
develop many new interests as members of the academic community. They
should be free to organize and join associations to promote their common
interests."22 2 Moreover, the statement noted, "Students and student
organizations should be free to examine and discuss all questions of interest to
them, and to express opinions publicly and privately. They should always be
free to support causes by orderly means which do not disrupt the regular and
essential operation of the institution." 22 3
The statement further recognized the academic freedom right of students to
participate in institutional governance. It provided,
MOVEMENT: BLACK STUDENTS AND THE RACIAL RECONSTITUTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION,
1965-1972(2012).
216 For a discussion of the Free Speech movement, see generally DAVID LANCE GOINEs,
THE FREE SPEECH MOVEMENT: COMING OF AGE IN THE 1960s (1993); Robert Cohen, The
Many Meanings of the FSM: In Lieu of an Introduction, in THE FREE SPEECH MOVEMENT:
REFLECTIONS ON BERKELEY IN THE 1960s 1 (Robert Cohen & Reginald E. Zelnik eds., 2002).
217 For a discussion of the student-led Vietnam protests, see generally SIMON HALL,
PEACE AND FREEDOM: THE CIVIL RIGHTS AND ANTIWAR MOVEMENTS IN THE 1960s (2005);
TOM HAYDEN, THE PORT HURON STATEMENT: THE VISIONARY CALL OF THE 1960s
REVOLUTION (2005); KIRKPATRICK SALE, SDS (1973).
218 1967 Joint Statement, supra note 213, at 366.
219 Id
2201d
221 Id
222 Jd
223Id at 366-67. The Joint Statement also provided, "Students should be allowed to
invite and to hear any person of their own choosing.... The institutional control of campus
facilities should not be used as a device of censorship." Id at 367.
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As constituents of the academic community, students should be free,
individually and collectively, to express their views on issues of institutional
policy and on matters of general interest to the student body. The student body
should have clearly defined means to participate in the formulation and
application of institutional policy affecting academic and student affairs. 224
Finally, the statement addressed students' rights, in general, both on and off
campus. It observed that "students should enjoy the same freedom of speech,
peaceful assembly, and right of petition that other citizens enjoy" and warned
that "[fjaculty members and administrative officials should insure that
institutional powers are not employed to inhibit such intellectual and personal
development of students as is often promoted by their exercise of the rights of
citizenship both on and off campus." 22 5
In sum, based on the 1967 Joint Statement, academic freedom for students
at American colleges and universities is freedom to actively engage in the
learning process in the classroom, associate and organize with others on campus,
express their ideas on and off campus, and meaningfully participate in
institutional governance. These elements of student freedom are connected by
one fundamental principal-the student'sfreedom to learn.
These elements should be incorporated into student handbooks, university
catalogs, institutional rules, and other written materials to create contractual
obligations for both universities and their students. I began this Article with an
exploration of student activism for racial justice as the most salient example of
contemporary student activism that is spreading across the nation. In order to
explore how the learning principle contained in the AAUP 1967 Joint Statement
could be applied to this example, I will analyze the tensions between "the
marketplace of ideas" and demands for racial equity and inclusion that have
arisen in recent campus disputes and suggest a balancing-test approach that
incorporates students' rights in resolving this tension.
V. TENSION BETWEEN "THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS" AND STUDENT
DEMANDS FOR RACIAL EQUITY AND INCLUSION
In Keyishian v. Board ofRegents, the Supreme Court described the higher
education classroom as "the marketplace of ideas." 226 Keyishian involved a
challenge to a state-imposed loyalty oath for all state employees. 227 The case
was brought by four university professors and a university librarian who also
served as a part-time lecturer. 22 8 The Court struck down the loyalty oath
224 1967 Joint Statement, supra note 213, at 367.
2251d The 1967 Joint Statement also outlines procedural standards in disciplinary
proceedings. Id at 367-68.
22 6 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
2271d at 592.
228Id
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requirement (i.e., the Feinberg Law) as a violation of the First Amendment.2 29
The Court recognized, "The classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.'
The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that
robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues,
[rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection."' 230
Tension potentially exists between higher education as "the marketplace of
ideas" and student demands for racial equity and inclusion. 23 1 The hope is that
all ideas will be expressed and debated and the best ones will prevail. However,
one student's speech disparaging racial minorities in the marketplace can
impede another student's sense of inclusion and belonging on that campus and
prevent that student from even participating in the dialogue. And one student's
demands for inclusion and belonging can come at the expense of another student
having to reflect on how his or her speech negatively affects others before
speaking and chill speech in that way. In sum, there are a number of competing
interests at stake when analyzing free speech issues. In order to provide concrete
examples, I will detail two recent attempts to codify free speech on campus.
A. Two Universities' Recent Attempts To Codify Free Expression on
Campus
1. University of Chicago's Policy
In July 2014, the president and provost of the University of Chicago asked
free speech scholar Geoffrey R. Stone to lead a faculty committee on freedom
of expression. 232 The committee was charged "' in light of recent events
nationwide that have tested institutional commitments to free and open
discourse' . . . to draft a statement 'articulating the University's overarching
commitment to free, robust, and uninhibited debate and deliberation among all
members of the University's community."' 233
229Id. at 609. This case was the first to link academic freedom with the First
Amendment. Id. at 603 ("Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic
freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned.
That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate
laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.").230 Id. at 603.
231 I say "potentially exists" because framed another way, "the marketplace of ideas"
encompasses student protests and does not focus exclusively on the people who claim they
are being silenced by such expression. For purposes of this Article, I use a definition of this
concept that focuses on the free speech rights of people whose ideas the protestors are
demonstrating against.
232 Laura Demanksi, Opening Inquiry, U. CHI. MAG. (July-Aug. 2015),
http://mag.uchicago.edu/university-news/opening-inquiry [https://perma.cc/QY2F-BX22].
2 3 3 GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM OF ExPREssION
(Jan. 2015) [hereinafter CHICAGO STATEMENT], https://provost.uchicago.edu/sites/defaultfiles/
documents/reports/FOECommitteeReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YJ9-DU65].
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The committee's statement was released in January 2015.234 Since the
University of Chicago is a private institution, it is not restricted by the First
Amendment. As such, the statement does not mention this amendment as a
foundation for its principles. 23 5 Instead, the authors focus on policy
considerations relevant to higher education. 236 If this document is legally
binding, it will be based on state contract law. 23 7
After briefly recounting the institution's historical dedication to free speech,
it begins:
Because the University [of Chicago] is committed to free and open inquiry in
all matters, it guarantees all members of the University community the broadest
possible latitude to speak, write, listen, challenge, and learn. Except insofar as
limitations on that freedom are necessary to the functioning of the University,
the University of Chicago fully respects and supports the freedom of all
members of the University community "to discuss any problem that presents
itself." 23 8
The report acknowledges that ideas "will often and quite naturally
conflict." 239 It continues:
But it is not the proper role of the University to attempt to shield individuals
from ideas and opinions they find unwelcome, disagreeable, or even deeply
offensive. Although the University greatly values civility, and although all
members of the University community share in the responsibility for
maintaining a climate of mutual respect, concerns about civility and mutual
respect can never be used as a justification for closing off discussion of ideas,
however offensive or disagreeable those ideas may be to some members of our
community. 240
The statement focuses particular attention on the obligations of the
university to not fetter speech. The statement then turns to the proper limits of
speech by noting:
The freedom to debate and discuss the merits of competing ideas does not, of
course, mean that individuals may say whatever they wish, wherever they wish.
2341d.
23 5 _ld
2361d
237 See, e.g., Holert v. Univ. of Chi., 751 F. Supp. 1294, 1301 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (noting
that the relationship between a student plaintiff and the University of Chicago is "strictly
contractual in nature"); Raethz v. Aurora Univ., 805 N.E.2d 696, 699 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)
("[I]n the student-university context, a student may have a remedy for breach of contract
when it is alleged that an adverse academic decision has been made concerning the student
but only if that decision was made arbitrarily, capriciously, or in bad faith.").
2 3 8 CHICAGO STATEMENT, supra note 233.
2391d
2401d
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The University may restrict expression that violates the law, that falsely
defames a specific individual, that constitutes a genuine threat or harassment,
that unjustifiably invades substantial privacy or confidentiality interests, or that
is otherwise directly incompatible with the functioning of the University. In
addition, the University may reasonably regulate the time, place, and manner
of expression to ensure that it does not disrupt the ordinary activities of the
University. 24 1
The statement notes that these limits "are narrow exceptions to the general
principle of freedom of expression, and it is vitally important that these
exceptions never be used in a manner that is inconsistent with the University's
commitment to a completely free and open discussion of ideas." 242 The
statement then summarizes its main point, "In a word, the University's
fundamental commitment is to the principle that debate or deliberation may not
be suppressed because the ideas put forth are thought by some or even by most
members of the University community to be offensive, unwise, immoral, or
wrong-headed." 24 3  Again, the statement focuses on the university's
commitment to open dialogue.
The statement emphasizes that "fostering the ability of members of the
University community to engage in such debate and deliberation in an effective
and responsible manner is an essential part of the University's educational
mission." 244 Finally, it stresses:
Although members of the University community are free to criticize and
contest the views expressed on campus, and to criticize and contest speakers
who are invited to express their views on campus, they may not obstruct or
otherwise interfere with the freedom of others to express views they reject or
even loathe. To this end, the University has a solemn responsibility not only to
promote a lively and fearless freedom of debate and deliberation, but also to
protect that freedom when others attempt to restrict it.24 5
Here, for the first time in the statement, obligations are imposed on the
university committee as a whole.24 6 While prior sections of the statement
focused on the university's obligations and commitments, in this paragraph it
imposes a duty on members of the university community, which the university
will enforce when breached. 24 7 It prohibits members of the university
community from any obstruction of or interference with on-campus speech.2 48
241 Id
242Id
243Id
24 4 CHCAGO STATEMENT, supra note 233.24 5 Id
246jd.
247 Id.
24 8 Id Note that the University of Chicago has a protest policy in place that provides, in
part: "The right of freedom of expression at the University includes peaceful protests and
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The popularity of the Chicago Statement is growing. Portions of it have
already been adopted by Princeton University, a private institution, along with
Purdue University, a public entity, and other colleges and universities. 249
Further, the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education has endorsed the
statement and has been involved in a campaign to urge higher education
institutions across the country to adopt it.2 50
2. University ofMinnesota's Policy
On March 10, 2016, a faculty committee at the University of Minnesota, in
a seven-to-two vote, provisionally approved and invited comment on a policy
statement regarding free speech that has been hailed as "the strongest such
affirmation seen on any campus." 2 51 This statement comes in the wake of
several campus controversies-including incidents of protestors shouting down
invited speakers and the university's investigation into an event poster that
reproduced a controversial illustration of the prophet Mohammed from the French
orderly demonstrations. At the same time, the University has long recognized that the right
to protest and demonstrate does not include the right to engage in conduct that disrupts the
University's operations or endangers the safety of others." Student Manual: Protests &
Demonstrations Policy, U. Cm., https://studentmanual.uchicago.edu/protest [https://perma.cc/
Y7J4-HD6V]. However, unlike the recent Chicago Statement that specifically addresses
invited speaker interruption, this policy does not seem to contemplate that situation-that is,
very few interruptions will rise to the level of interrupting university operations or
endangering the safety of others. I surmise the existing policy was deemed insufficient to
address speaker interruption so the new statement was used to articulate the university's
stance on such interruption.
249Princeton Office of Communications, Faculty Adopts Statement Affirming
Commitment to Freedom of Expression at Princeton, PRINCETON U. (Apr. 7, 2015),
http://www.princeton.edu/main/news/archive/S42/84/36147/index.xml?section-topstories
[https://perma.cc/F7KQ-496J]; Purdue Adopts 'Chicago Principles' To Protect Free
Speech, Cm. TRIB. (May 23, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-
purdue-chicago-principles-free-speech-20150523-story.html [https://perma.cc/UUT6-4JLA];
Universities and Free Speech: Hard To Say, ECONOMIST (Jan. 30, 2016), http://www.econo
mistcom/news/united-states/21689603-statement-heart-debate-over-academic-freedom-hard-say
[https://perma.cc/8VPK-95Y8].
250 Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, FIRE Endorses University of
Chicago's New Free Speech Statement, FIRE (Jan. 7, 2015), https://www.thefire.org/fire-
endorses-university-of-chicagos-new-free-speech-statement/ [https://permacc/45L2-HHK6];
Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, FIRE Launches Campaign in Support of
University ofChicago Free Speech Statement, FIRE (Sept. 28, 2015), https-/www.thefire.org/
fire-launches-campaign-in-suppoit-of-university-of-chicago-free-speech-statement-pr/ [https//per
ma.cc/V25Q-QCBR].
251 Colleen Flaherty, Free Speech Above All, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 10, 2016),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/05/10/minnesota-faculty-senate-ponders-policy-
making-free-speech-paramount [https/perma.cc/5GQ7-TF33]; see also Dale Carpenter, Top
Minnesota Faculty Committee Backs Free Speech Resolution, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/03/1 1/top-minnesota-
faculty-committee-backs-free-speech-resolution/ [https://perma.cc/T4Q8-YQ9M].
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satire magazine Charlie Hebdo.252 The proposed statement begins, "Ideas are the
lifeblood of a free society and universities are its beating heart. If freedom of
speech is undermined on a university campus, it is not safe anywhere. The
University of Minnesota resolves that the freedom of speech is, and will always
be, safe at this institution." 253
The statement then enumerates four core principles. First, "[a] public
university must be absolutely committed to protecting free speech, both for
constitutional and academic reasons."254 The statement explains:
As a public institution, the University of Minnesota has a constitutional
obligation under the First Amendment to safeguard the freedom of speech. As
an academic institution, the University must cultivate a community-wide norm
of respect for free speech that goes beyond ensuring mere First Amendment
compliance.... Every member of the University community-including
administrators, faculty, offices, staff, and students-must respect both the right
of others to speak and the right of listeners to hear that speech. No member of
the University community has the right to prevent or disrupt expression. 2 55
Of particular note in this section, the University of Minnesota is a state
institution so its statement incorporates First Amendment principles in defining
the contours of free speech.2 56 At the same time, this public institution
promulgates additional principles based on community-wide norms of being an
academic institution.2 57 This section also focuses on the obligations of both the
institution and its individual members to ensure free speech. It proposes an
absolute prohibition on speech disruption. 258
Second, the statement provides, "Free speech includes protection for speech
that some find offensive, uncivil, or even hateful."2 59 The statement elaborates:
252 Dale Carpenter, Israeli Academic Shouted Down in Lecture at University of
Minnesota, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2015), https//www.washingtonpostcom/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2015/11/04fisraeli-academic-shouted-down-in-lecure-at-university-of-minnesota/
[https://perma.ce/TVM6-5LF4]. The author of this article, Dale Carpenter, is also a faculty
member on the committee that subsequently developed the free speech statement. Alex
Morey, Minnesota Faculty Senate Committee To Consider Free Speech Resolution, FIRE
(Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.thefire.org/minnesota-faculty-senate-committee-to-consider-
free-speech-resolution/ [https://perma.cc/QZ3N-M9TW]. In the article, Carpenter states that
"there is no right to shout down a speaker at an academic lecture on the grounds of a public
university." Carpenter, supra.
2 53 Minnesota Faculty Consultative Committee, Free Speech at the University of
Minnesota: Four Core Principles 1 (Mar. 10, 2016) [hereinafter Minnesota Principles],
http://usenate.umn.edu/usenate/docs/160505freespeech core_principles.pdf [https://perma.cc/
RZU4-PWPD].
2541d.
255 Id.
256jd.
2 5 7 See id at 1-2.
2 5 8 See id
259 Minnesota Principles, supra note 253, at 2.
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The shock, hurt, and anger experienced by the targets of malevolent speech
may undermine the maintenance of a campus climate that welcomes all and
fosters equity and diversity. But at a public university, no word is so
blasphemous or offensive it cannot be uttered; no belief is so sacred or widely
held it cannot be criticized; no idea is so intolerant it cannot be tolerated. So
long as the speech is constitutionally protected, and neither harasses nor
threatens another person, it cannot be prohibited. 2 60
Third, the statement provides, "Free speech cannot be regulated on the
ground that some speakers are thought to have more power or more access to
the mediums ofspeech than others."2 61 The statement clarifies,
The University may use its resources to ensure that community members have
space and access to present differing viewpoints. But University
officials ... cannot assume the authority to pick and choose who may speak or
how much they may speak based on the perception that some speakers have
"too much" or "too little" power in public debate.262
Finally, the statement emphasizes, "Even when protecting free speech
conflicts with other important University values, free speech must be
paramount."263 The statement explains, "The University does not condone
speech that is uncivil or hateful, and [University] officials should make this
clear. Nevertheless, on those rare occasions when protecting expression
conflicts with other values, like maintaining a climate of mutual respect on
campus, the right to speak must prevail." 2 64
The faculty committee later unanimously approved for further consideration
a list of five recommendations to protect free speech on campus. 265 First, the
recommendations propose that the university take steps to "[floster
understanding of the meaning and value of free speech" by including the
statement on free speech "in all orientation materials, all University catalogues,
and all employee handbooks." 2 66 If this recommendation is implemented, these
260 Id
261 Id
262 jd
263 Id
264 Id
265 Dale Carpenter, Top Faculty Committee at Minnesota Moves Speech
Recommendations, WASH. POST (May 3, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh
-conspiracy/wp/201 6/05/03/top-faculty-committee-at-minnesota-moves-speech-recommendations/
[https//perna.ce/N9D4-DBEX].
266 Minnesota Faculty Consultative Committee, Free Speech at the University of
Minnesota: Recommendations 1 (Apr. 21, 2016) [hereinafter Minnesota Recommendations],
http://usenate.umn.edu/usenate/docs/1 60505fiee speech recommendations.pdf[https//perma.cc/
RZU4-PWPD].
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written materials may later be deemed contractual in Minnesota. 267 Second, the
recommendations urge that the university "[e]ncourage a climate of respectful
debate about controversial topics," including "efforts to sponsor structured
debates about controversial topics."2 68 Third, the recommendations outline
procedures to "[v]igorously protect free speech when serious disruption is
anticipated or actually occurs." 26 9 Fourth, the recommendations advocate for
the appointment of "a free speech-advocate whose role is to ensure that freedom
of expression is respected and protected during any investigation in which the
investigative office determines that all or part of the basis for the complaint is
expression." 270 This recommendation is made in the aftermath of an
investigation by the University of Minnesota's Office of Equal Opportunity and
Affirmative Action (EOAA) based on complaints lodged by Muslim
students.271 It is a recommendation in which the idea that free speech is a
paramount value-superseding all others-is most evident. The
recommendation elaborates:
Investigations by various University offices-including but not limited to
EOAA and Human Resources-sometimes implicate free speech values. Yet
despite the potential threat to free speech posed by such investigations, it is not
clear that University investigatory offices see it as their duty to consider the
effect of their investigations on the climate for free speech. They do not
necessarily internalize the value of free speech at a public university. Their
focus is on cleansing public discussion so that it is inoffensive. Otherwise, they
fear, the University will be unwelcoming to some in the community. The effect
is to create an imbalance by which protected speech is subordinated to other
values. But speech may not be curtailed simply because it is offensive. And it
is the duty of every member of the University community-including those
with investigatory power-to respect and protect speech. 2 72
This language frames the work of "investigatory offices"-such as the
diversity and human resources offices-as pitted against free speech values and
argues that such work compromises free speech because its purpose is to
"cleanse" public discussion. 273 Thus, the recommendation urges the need of a
free speech advocate to fight back against this perceived threat.2 74 Finally, the
2 67 See Abbariao v. Hamline Univ. Sch. of Law, 258 N.W.2d 108, 113 (Minn. 1977)
("Elements of the law of contracts have been applied to the student-university relationship,
but rigid importation of contractual doctrine has been rejected.").
268 Minnesota Recommendations, supra note 266, at 1.
2691d at 1-2.
2 7 0 Id at 3.
271 Maura Lerner, Poster for Free-Speech Forum Sets Off Debate at University of
Minnesota, STAR TRIB. (May 5, 2015), httpl//www.startribune.com/poster-for-free-speech-
fonrm-sets-off-debate-at-university-of-minnesota/302689691/ [https://perma.ccl5YZ3-SE78].
2 72 Minnesota Recommendations, supra note 266, at 2.
2 73 _[d.
274 Id at 3.
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recommendations call for "minimum procedural protections for faculty,
students, and others subject to investigation [that involve speech]."27 5
B. What the Universities' Policies Omit--Student Activism as a
Mechanism ofLearning for Both Students and Their Colleges and
Universities
Insofar as the free speech statements from the University of Chicago and
the University of Minnesota are based on policy considerations that are unique
to higher education, there is an essential consideration that is absent from both
statements. Specifically, they both fail to consider the academic freedom of the
student protestors, in favor of an overarching institutional commitment to free
expression on campus. The statements do this in a number of ways.
First, the statements assume that students' interests are necessarily aligned
with an almost absolute commitment to free speech in "the marketplace of
ideas." However, in some situations, the marketplace would include speech that
does not amount to a tort or a crime, but nonetheless makes students of color
feel degraded or unwelcome. And any response, including organized protests,
from the students on the receiving end of such speech can easily be framed as
an attack on the racist speaker's free speech rights in the marketplace. Thus,
many students who are pushing for racial justice today are not comforted by
appeals to embrace the First Amendment as the supreme guiding principle that
will protect their interests. Instead, they see such appeals as antithetical to their
interests. For example, in an open letter to the Wesleyan University community
in the fall of 2015, a number of students of color, commenting on racial tensions
on campus, wrote:
When students of color speak our lives into existence, our speech comes
under attack. When we defend our lives, we are harassing you. When we
demand safety, we are attacking you. Our unapologetic voices are
deranged screams; our open hands are clenched fists; our cellphones, weapons,
our pigment, targets.
Centering this conversation on free speech, without the context of the
voices historically censored and misrepresented, is the very manifestation of
systemic and structural racism that continues to silence and murder people of
color.27 6
These student activists understand that a blind embrace of free speech
principles is not, and has never been, an adequate solution to address their
grievances. Indeed, they recognize the ways in which the free speech argument
2 75 Id at 4.
276An Open Letter to the Wesleyan Community from Students of Color, WESLEYING
(Sept. 25, 2015), http://wesleying.org/2015/09/25/an-open-letter-to-the-wesleyan-community-
from-students-of-color/ [https://perma.cc/PJ5T-8XE5].
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has been a tactic of "systemic and structural racism" that has been used against
them in their fight for racial justice.277
These activists have strong historical precedents on their side in that free
speech principles have not protected people of color from racism. For example,
the First Amendment cozily existed with slavery and Jim Crow. It did nothing
to protect the speech of slaves or the expression of racial minorities who were
refused entry into the classrooms to speak. Specifically, to the extent there has
been a "marketplace of ideas" at American college and university campuses,
people of color have been legally excluded from the market for much of the
history of these institutions. 278 One of the ways this exclusion occurred is that
judges have not historically recognized any legal rights of people of African
descent.279 Another legal mechanism that enabled educational exclusion was the
demonization of non-whiteness that served as a justification for the denial of
legal rights to those people who possessed this status.2 80
Second, the policy statements create a bright-line rule restricting any
disruption as an illegitimate form of protest without considering that sometimes
at least limited disruption is a type of legitimate expression that conveys strong
dissent. The bright-line rule does not allow the flexibility to take into account
the protestor's right to use this form of expression. Writing when he was
277 Id.
27 See supra Part II for analysis on the historical context of racial exclusion on
American college campuses.279 See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404-08 (1856) ("The question before
us is, whether [people of African descent] compose a portion of this people, and are
constituent members of this sovereignty? We think they are not, and that they are not
included, and were not intended to be included, under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution,
and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for
and secures to citizens of the United States. On the contrary, they were at that time considered
as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race,
and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights
or privileges but such as those who held the power and the Government might choose to
grant them.... They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an
inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political
relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to
respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.").
2 8 0 See IAN HANEY LOPEz, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 27-77
(2006) (discussing how whiteness and non-whiteness-in particular, Asian-ness-were
legally constructed to exclude non-white people from naturalization); Bethany R. Berger,
Red: Racism and the American Indian, 56 UCLA L. REV. 591, 628-39 (2009) (detailing the
unique ways in which racism excluded Native Americans from public institutions, even
though the policies at the time--between 1871 to 1928-were touting assimilation); Cheryl
I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1707, 1715-24 (1993) (analyzing how
whiteness is a form of property that enabled its possessors to acquire and secure other forms
of property while those who lacked it-specifically African Americans and Native
Americans-have been denied such acquisition and security); Philip Lee, Identity Property:
Protecting the New IP in a Race-Relevant World, 117 W. VA. L. REv. 1183, 1185-96 (2015)
(discussing the interplay between whiteness and non-whiteness in which whiteness has been
protected by law, while non-whiteness has been degraded).
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president of the AAUP, Cary Nelson noted that "an interruption that signals
extreme objection to a speaker's views is part of the acceptable intellectual life
of a campus, but you have to let the speech go on." 28 1 Nelson later wrote,
"Though briefly interrupting an invited speaker may be compatible with
academic freedom, actually preventing a talk or a performance from continuing
is not."2 82 This is an effective balancing of interests, in that it allows the speaker
to continue and finish, it allows the protestors to voice their strong objections-
even to the point of briefly disrupting a speaker, and it allows the audience to
hear all of these messages. A prohibition against any and all disruption fails to
take into account the multiple interests involved in campus speech disputes.
Third, the statements assume that student dissent is something to be merely
tolerated by the university community. This is problematic in that it ignores the
ways in which student activism can be beneficial. In the alternative, I propose
that student activism should be framed as a form of student learning and civic
engagement and embraced as something that the community can learn from.
Student activism has a number of benefits for numerous stakeholders. For
example, for students, activism is associated with a stronger sense of student
leadership, 28 3 democratic citizenship,284 civic engagement 2 85 and higher levels
of political involvement later in life.2 86 Also, campus cultures conducive to
student activism positively affect the student's development of critical thinking
skills.2 87 Further, even nonparticipating engaged observers of student
activism-"individuals who are attentive to movement writings and activities,
and express moral and even financial support for them, but who take no other
action"2 88-have increased political participation later in life.2 89 Finally, student
activism can also have benefits for the institution by highlighting issues and
281 Scott Jaschik, Is Heckling a Right?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb. 17, 2010),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2010/02/17/heckle [https://perma.cc/2UW5-NZKH].
282 Cary Nelson, Defining Academic Freedom, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Dec. 21, 2010),
httpsl//www.insidehighered.com/views/2010/12/21/defining-academic-fredom [https://perma.cc/
RQ4Y-DCLL].
2 83 See Chambers & Phelps, supra note 1, at 27.
2 84 See Florence A. Hamrick, Democratic Citizenship and Student Activism, 39 J.C.
STUDENT DEv. 449, 457 (1998).
2 85 See J. Patrick Biddix et al., Protest Reconsidered: Identifying Democratic and Civic
Engagement Learning Outcomes, 34 INNOVATIVE HIGHER EDUC. 133, 140-42 (2009).
2 86 See, e.g., Elizabeth R. Cole & Abigail J. Stewart, Meanings ofPolitical Participation
Among Black and White Women: Political Identity and Social Responsibility, 71 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 130, 136 (1996).
287See, e.g, Lisa Tsui, Effects of Campus Culture on Students' Critical Thinking, 23
REV. OF HIGHER EDUC. 421, 432 (2000). A professor at one of the studied institutions
observed, "The campus culture here has to do with environmental concerns, social activism,
and social justice... . As a result [the students] have to be able to examine issues." Id
288 Abigail J. Stewart et al., Women and the Social Movements of the 1960s: Activists,
Engaged Observers, and Nonparticipants, 19 POL. PSYCHOL. 63, 63 (1998).
2891_d at 80.
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grievances that would otherwise be unknown or misunderstood. 290 The causes
that student activists choose to champion are reflections of how they are
experiencing their institutions and their home communities. Therefore, student
activism can serve to create spaces of learning where the university
community-students, faculty, and staff-can be exposed to the issues
underlying the students' grievances.
Although seen merely as annoyances by some administrators and faculty, 29 1
it actually benefits the student activists, student observers, and the institution
itself. Thus, since the "marketplace of ideas"-as framed as a mechanism to
protect people who say things offensive to racial and other minorities-is just
one of many competing values, there should be some mechanism to
acknowledge and consider the other values. In the next Part, I propose a
balancing test that takes into account the students' academic freedom right to
engage in such activism in two particular contexts-students interrupting
invited speakers and students occupying buildings.
C. Reconciliation: A Balancing Test
Increasing numbers of students are engaging in student activism because
email and social media platforms have provided innovative methods for student
activists to express themselves, connect with others, and organize their
activities.292 Indeed, today's college freshman class is more likely to participate
in student-led protests than in each of the nearly five decades that preceded it,
including the freshmen of the 1960s and 1970s-two decades known for their
campus activism. 293 Student activism, therefore, is becoming a normal part of
the contemporary college experience.
College and university administrators appear to be at a crossroads. On the
one hand, they can choose to create rules that cease and deter student activism;
2 90 See Hamrick, supra note 284, at 457 ("Dissenting students offer alternate opinions,
conclusions, and judgments, allowing a broader range of perspectives and enriching
subsequent dialogue. In terms of democratic political theory, the challenges to extant
assumptions represented by this broader range of perspectives increases the potential that a
campus can make considered, conscious decisions about what multiculturalism will mean on
the campus.").
291 See, e.g., Anemona Hartocollis, Student Protesters Self-Absorbed and Narcissistic,
Oklahoma College President Says, N.Y. TIMEs (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
102/us/student-protesters-self-absorbed-and-narcissistic-oklahoma-college-president-says.htnI
(on file with Ohio State Law Journal).
292 J. Patrick Biddix, Technology Uses in Campus Activism from 2000 to 2008:
Implications for Civic Learning, 51 J.C. STUDENT DEV. 679, 684-88 (2010).
2 9 3 See KEvIN EAGAN ET AL., COOP. INST. RESEARCH PROGRAM, THE AMERICAN
FRESHMAN: NATIONAL NORMS FALL 2015, at 7-8, http://www.heri.ucla.edu/monographs/
TheAmericanFreshman2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6LJ-48MP]; see also Courtney Kueppers,
Today's Freshman Class Is the Most Likely To Protest in Half a Century, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC. (Feb. 11. 2016), http://chronicle.com/article/Today-s-Freshman-Class-Is/235273 (on
file with Ohio State Law Journal).
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on the other hand, they can choose to craft policies that recognize the value of
student voices. I argue for the latter. Student activism should be viewed as a
developmental component of student learning. As such, protecting student
activism through academic freedom is entirely consistent with the AAUP's 1967
Joint Statement's focus on Lernfeiheit-the students' freedom to learn. 294
Thus, college and university administrators should take students' protest
rights-framed as an academic freedom right to learn-into account in
developing their free speech policies. I propose a balancing test for this purpose.
This test could be applied to many tactics of student activists-from interrupting
classes to painting political messages on campus buildings to staging die-ins on
campus sidewalks. However, to illustrate my proposal, I present two specific
tactics that have spurred targeted university policy responses-speaker
interruption and building occupation.
1. Speaker Interruption
In recent years, student activists for racial justice have occasionally
interrupted speakers to show their strong dissent, sometimes even shutting down
the events through their disruption. 295 I believe that the invited speakers at these
events should be allowed to finish their presentations; however, instead of
advocating for a bright-line rule that bans all interruption, I wish to propose a
balancing test included in campus policies that takes into account the student
protestors' academic freedom along with the rights of invited speakers and
audience members. To be clear, I am not arguing for a university-imposed
prohibition on speech that students find objectionable. Indeed, I would urge
students to engage in activism over asking the administration to censor speech.
Further, I am not arguing that students have the right to terminate events that
feature speakers that the students strongly disagree with. Instead, I am arguing
for a balancing test in campus-speech disputes that takes into account multiple
competing interests. Two institutions have attempted such a balance in their
policies-Harvard Law School and the University of Michigan.
294 See 1967 Joint Statement, supra note 213, at 366.
295 See, e.g., Jillian Lanney & Carolynn Cong, Ray Kelly Lecture Canceled Amidst
Student, Community Protest, BROWN DAILY HERALD (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.browndaily
herald.com/2013/10/30/ray-kelly-lecture-canceled-amidst-student-community-protest/
[https/perna.cd3X74-UQLP]; Eugene Volokh, Speech by Conservative Speaker Milo
Yiannopoulos Shut Down by Protestors at DePaul-Police and Security Don't Intervene,
WASH. POST (May 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/
2016/05/25/speech-by-conservative-speaker-milo-yiannopoulos-shut-down-by-protesters-at-
depaul-police-and-security-dont-intervene/ (on file with Ohio State Law Journal).
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a. Harvard Law School's Policy
Harvard Law School's protest and dissent policy is an attempted balance of
multiple interests.29 6 In addressing the balancing of rights at events featuring
invited speakers, the policy begins:
The right to dissent is the complement of the right to speak, but these rights
need not occupy the same forum at the same time. The speaker is entitled to
communicate her or his message to the audience during her or his allotted time,
and the audience is entitled to hear the message and see the speaker during that
time. A dissenter must not substantially interfere with a speaker's ability to
communicate or an audience's ability to see and hear the speaker.2 97
In addressing noise and the audience's responsibility, the policy continues:
Responding vocally to the speaker, spontaneously and temporarily, is
generally acceptable, especially ifreaction against the speaker is similar in kind
and degree to reaction in his or her favor. Chanting or making other sustained
or repeated noise in a manner which substantially interferes with the speaker's
communication is not permitted, whether inside or outside the meeting.
The audience, like the host and the speaker, must respect the right to
dissent. A member of the audience or the host organization who substantially
interferes with acceptable dissent is violating these guidelines in the same way
as a dissenter who violates the rights of the speaker or audience. 2 98
Harvard Law School's policy is an attempt to balance the interests of: 1) the
invited speaker; 2) the protestor; and 3) the non-protesting audience member.
Under the policy, a protestor will not be allowed to substantially interfere with
a speaker, but his or her right to dissent is taken into consideration in the balance.
Thus, a spontaneous and temporary outburst is an acceptable form of expression,
while sustained and repeated chanting is not.299 Also, the audience is not
allowed to violate the rights of the protestor to express dissent.300 This explicit
protection of protestor's right is crucial because it acknowledges that this form
296 Allan R. Gold, Education; At Harvard Guidelines on Speech and Dissent, N.Y.
TIMEs (Oct. 12, 1988), http/A/www.nyimes.com/1988/10/12/us/education-at-harvard-guidelines-
on-speech-and-dissent.html (on file with Ohio State Law Journal) ("Sarah Wald, the law
school's dean of students, said the new guidelines were 'an attempt to balance the rights of
speakers with the rights of people to protest and dissent."').
297 Protest and Dissent Guidelines, HARv. L. ScH., http://hls.harvard.edu/dept/dos/student-
orgs/handbook-for-officers/protest-and-dissent-guidelines/ (on file with Ohio State Law
Journal).2 9 8 Id
299 Id
3001d.
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of expression is worthy of protection. The First Amendment does not apply to
Harvard Law School because it is not a state actor.30 1 Therefore, if this policy
creates any binding obligations, then they may be enforceable in contract law.302
b. University of Michigan's Policy
The University of Michigan, in a free speech policy that applies to events
with invited speakers or artists, also attempts to balance a number of competing
interests that includes the freedom of the protestors. 303 The policy provides:
Within the confines of a hall or physical facility, or in the vicinity of the place
in which a member of the University community, invited speaker, or invited
artist is addressing an assembled audience, protesters must not interfere unduly
with communication between a speaker or artist and members of the audience.
This prohibition against undue interference does not include suppression of the
usual range of human reactions commonly displayed by an audience during
heated discussions of controversial topics. Nor does this prohibition include
various expressions of protest, including heckling and the display of signs
(without sticks or poles), so long as such activities are consistent with the
continuation of a speech or performance and the communication of its content
to the audience. 304
The policy then explicitly recognizes the rights of protestors:
Protesters have rights, just as do speakers and artists. The standard of "undue
interference" must not be invoked lightly, merely to avoid brief interruptions,
or to remove distractions or embarrassment. The University has an obligation
to provide members of the community, and invited speakers and artists, with
personal security and with reasonable platforms for expression; moreover, it
has an obligation to insure audience access to public events. The University
does not, however, have the obligation to insure audience passivity. The
University cannot accept stipulations by invited speakers or artists of terms of
appearance that are inconsistent with allowing full freedom of expression to
the University community. 30 5
301 Krohn v. Harvard Law Sch., 552 F.2d 21,23-25 (1st Cir. 1977) (holding that Harvard
Law School is not a state actor).
302 See, e.g., Walker v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 82 F. Supp. 3d 524, 528
(D. Mass. 2014) ("'[A]n entering student forms a contractual relationship with her
university'. . . . Contracts between students and universities are interpreted 'in accordance
with the parties' reasonable expectations, giving those terms the meaning that the university
reasonably should expect the student to take from them."' (citations omitted)).
303 Standard Practice Guide Policies: Freedom of Speech and Artistic Expression, U.
MCH. (Apr. 1, 1993), http://www.spg.umich.edu/policy/601.01 [https//perma.cc/JS6F-VC2G].
304 Id
305 Id
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The University of Michigan's policy, like Harvard Law School's,
acknowledges and attempts to balance a number of potentially conflicting
interests. It goes further than Harvard's in protecting protestor rights because it
explicitly allows "heckling" as long as the speech is allowed to continue. 30 6 It
also permits brief interruptions and even outbursts that can cause distraction or
embarrassment. 30 7 The University of Michigan, as a public entity, is a state
actor; thus, the First Amendment applies to its policies. However, Michigan
courts have been reluctant to frame the university-student relationship as
contractual. 3 08
While Harvard Law School and the University of Michigan are going in the
right direction, I would urge that such statements should also incorporate the
1967 Joint Statement to their policies in order to provide a theoretical foundation
for the student protestor's right to dissent. In particular, the policies should
include the statement's focus on the students' freedom to learn as well as how
the institutions benefit from student dissent.309
2. Building Occupation
Another tactic that student activists for racial justice have used is occupying
buildings, specific offices, and other noncommon spaces on campus without
official permission in order to draw attention to their demands. For example, in
February 2015, thirteen students were arrested at the University of Minnesota
after staging a seven-hour sit-in at the university president's office. 3 10 The
students had a list of eight demands related to racial and gender equity and
inclusion: I) "More faculty for the Department of Chicano and Latino Studies;"
2) "The removal of racial descriptors from campus police crime alerts;" 3) "The
reversal of the decision to close the Postsecondary Teaching and Learning
Department by 2016-17;" 4) "More faculty of color;" 5) "A program to recruit
low-income Twin Cities high schoolers;" 6) "A requirement that all students
take at least one ethnic studies class;" 7) "A gender-neutral restroom in every
building;" and 8) "The removal of admissions application questions concerning
3 06 Id.
3 0 7 1d
308 See, e.g., Amayav. Mott Cmty. Coll., No. 186755, 1997 WL 33353479, at *1 (Mich.
Ct. App. Mar. 7, 1997) ("Indeed, both state and federal courts have stated that under
Michigan law contract and promissory estoppel claims brought by a student against a college
or university fail."). In states that refuse to recognize contractual obligations between
students and their universities, one would expect that universities would follow their own
policies and rules. At least one state permits challenges to universities, both private and
public, through a statutory mechanism that protects people from arbitrary and capricious
decisions made by such institutions. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 7801-06 (McKinney 2008).
309See supra Part V.B.
3 10 See Tad Vezner, 13 Arrests End Student Sit-In at UMI President's Office, TWIN
CITIES PIONEER PRESS (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.twincities.com/2015/02/10/13-arrests-
end-student-sit-in-at-umn-presidents-office/ [https://perma.cc/PWZ4-H5PN].
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criminal history and school discipline, including expulsions."311 Similar
occupations of campus buildings around the country were frequent in the 2015-
2016 academic year.3 12
Most free speech policies simply prohibit any unauthorized building or
office occupancy. 3 13 However, in crafting speech policies or disciplining
311 Id
3 12 See, e.g., Josh Logue, Protest and Power at Duke, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 7, 2016),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/04/07/duke-tries-end-protest-has-occupied-
administration-building-days [https://perma.cc/A4W9-TUAE] (detailing student protestors
at Duke occupying the central administrative building after a parking attendant accused the
university's executive vice president of hitting her with his car and using a racial slur); Claire
E. Parker, Law School Activists Occupy Student Center, HARV. CRIMSON (Feb. 17, 2016),
http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2016/2/17/activists-occupy-wasserstein/ [https://perma.cc/
8X2A-Q9NG] ("Student activists began to occupy a portion of Harvard Law School's
Caspersen Student Center Monday evening in an effort to create a space on campus they say
has been denied to minorities at the school. Calling the lounge 'Belinda Hall' after a former
slave of prominent Law School benefactors, the group of activists led by Reclaim Harvard
Law said they plan to remain there indefinitely."); Alisha A. Pina, Providence College
Students Occupy President's Office, PROVIDENCE J. (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.providence
joumal.com/article/20160216/NEWS/160219449 [https/permacc/C224-NCBE] ("More than 50
students of many ethnic backgrounds occupied the reception room of Providence College
President Rev. Brian J. Shanley's office Tuesday to demand improvements to what they
characterize as 'anti-blackness and racism on campus."'); Pat Schneider, Student Protesters
Occupy UW-Madison's College Library, Demand End to Graffiti Case, CAP. TIMES (Apr.
21, 2016), http://host.madison.com/ct/news/locaVeducation/university/student-protesters-occupy-
uw-madison-s-college-library-demand-end/article_503abl 54-39ee-59f7-a3b6-7db55fb90333.html
[https//perma.cc/A3HY-Z4NX] (detailing student protestors at University of Wisconsin-
Madison occupying a campus library after a student was arrested in class for spray painting
anti-racist messages across campus); Jason Song & Teresa Watanabe, After Days ofProtest,
Students Occupy Building at Occidental College, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2015),
http://www.latimes.com/local/education/la-me-college-race-20151117-story.html [https//permacc
/C224-NCBE] ("After several days of protesting Occidental College's handling of diversity
issues, students occupied an administrative building Monday, demanding that the school
president step down if officials don't take such steps as creating a black studies major and
hiring more minority faculty."); Susan Svrluga, Princeton Protesters Occupy President's
Office, Demand 'Racist' Woodrow Wilson's Name Be Removed, WASH. POST (Nov. 18,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2015/11/18/princeton-protesters-
occupy-presidents-office-demand-racist-woodrow-wilsons-name-be-removed/ [https://perma.cc/
CU94-8K98] ("Student protesters filled Princeton's historic Nassau Hall Wednesday
afternoon, sitting in the university president's office and refusing to leave until their demands
to improve the social and academic experiences of black students on campus are met-
starting with an acknowledgement of famous alumnus Woodrow Wilson's 'racist legacy'
and the removal of his name from all buildings.").
313 For example, a recently proposed free speech policy at the City University of New
York gives the following examples of prohibited activities during a demonstration: 1)
"overnight camping on university property;" and 2) "occupying or remaining on any property
or facility owned or operated by the university after receiving due notice to depart." Maxine
Joselow, Safeguarding Free Speech, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 20, 2016),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/06/20/cuny-considers-free-speech-policy
[https://perma.cc/NP4K-W5YN].
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students who violate building occupancy rules through their protests, I again
argue that the student's academic freedom rights of protest and dissent should
be taken into account. This balancing should recognize the protestor's rights,
other students' rights, and safety considerations. One possible application of this
balancing test would treat students who occupy buildings as an act of protest
with leniency when neither physical harm is committed nor significant property
damage inflicted. If the students interfere with university operations-either
administrative activities or teaching-then their rights to protest should be
balanced with those affected by the occupation. Perhaps minor interference
would be permitted, as determined on a case-by-case basis. However, serious
and prolonged interference would not. As part of my framework, this balancing
of interests would necessarily consider the student activists' freedom to engage
in public expressions of dissent and how these expressions can help educate the
campus on numerous issues.
My proposed balancing test is not limited to seizures of physical space. It
would also apply to seizures in cyberspace. Specifically, a balancing of interests
would be used in situations where student activists temporarily interrupt the
operation of websites or seize different types of electronic data such as emails
or cause other types of disruption in cyberspace. Although this has not been a
prominent form of protest activity, I think it is reasonable to anticipate that
student activists will use evolving technology along with their increased
technical savvy in this way sometime in the near future. Students would not be
shielded from institutional discipline in every situation, but they would be in
some. And at the very least, the learning principle contained in student academic
freedom will be part of the balancing.
This balancing of multiple interests and rights shifts the discourse in a way
that recognizes students as more than just passive receptacles of information
who merely consume information provided by the institution. It acknowledges
that students' experiences and perspectives contribute to learning and that their
voices are worth listening to. Indeed, some higher education administrators are
taking note of the students' demands and pursuing institutional reforms. 3 14 More
should follow.
In sum, student activism is all about learning. Students who engage in
protest learn from it as do students who observe it. Professors and institutions
should also take such activism as an opportunity to learn. Henry Reichman,
3 14 See Sarah Brown, How 3 College Presidents Are Trying To Move Their Campuses
Past Racial Tensions, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.chronicle.com/
article/How-3-College-Presidents-Are/237479 (on file with Ohio State Law Journal)
(discussing administrative collaboration with students demanding racial equity and inclusion
at Towson University, Oberlin College, and the University of Washington); Kirk Siegler,
Protesting Racial Bias, Students Trade Placards for Pillows, NPR (Nov. 25, 2015),
http://www.npr.org/2015/11/25/457231118/protesting-racial-bias-students-trade-placards-
for-pillows (on file with Ohio State Law Journal) ("Protests over racial discrimination on
college campuses are leading to some swift responses and pledges of reform by college
administrators.").
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AAUP's first vice president and chair of the association's Committee A on
Academic Freedom and Tenure, in language that is worth quoting at length,
writes about student activists:
They will offend others even as they respond to deeper offenses against their
own dignity. They may demonstrate indifference to the rights of others, as
protesters everywhere always have. But, in doing so, they will learn. And that,
it seems to me, is the essential point. Student academic freedom, in the final
analysis, is about the freedom to learn. And learning is impossible without
error.
What is therefore most remarkable about today's student movements is not
their alleged intolerance or immaturity. It is not their intemperance or supposed
oversensitivity to insult and indifference. It is that they have begun to grapple
with issues that their elders have resisted tackling for far too long. . . .
But the university, and especially its faculty, must also be willing to learn
from students. Faculty members should welcome the challenges the protesting
students have posed. Student movements offer countless opportunities for
students-as well as their teachers-to learn. To approach them in this way, in
the spirit of the student academic freedom proclaimed and defined by the
AAUP and its collaborators back in 1967, is therefore simply to fulfill our
responsibility as educators. 315
In sum, in order to embrace student activism as a learning opportunity for
the university community, free speech policies should consider the learning
principle articulated in the 1967 Joint Statement.3 16 Otherwise, colleges and
universities will be ignoring an essential part of academic freedom-that of the
students.
VI. CONCLUSION
Student activism for racial equity and inclusion is on a historic rise on
college and university campuses across the country. Students are reminding us
that Black lives matter. They are bringing attention to the ways in which the
normal operation of the legal system creates racial and other inequalities. They
are critiquing the ways in which their experiences and perspectives are pushed
to the margins in classrooms, on campuses, and in society.
In urging for university policies that allow for such activism to be moments
of teaching and learning for all involved, I argue in this Article that student
academic freedom to protest-conceived as a right to learn-should be
seriously considered by institutional decision-makers when they are creating
3 15 Henry Reichman, On Student Academic Freedom, INsIDE HIGHER ED (Dec. 4, 2015),
https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2015/12/04/what-does-student-academic-freedom-
entail-essay [https://perma.cc/8BMB-RMQX].
3 16 See supra Part IV.B.
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rules and policies governing on-campus student dissent. Otherwise, student
voices will be deemed irrelevant and protests will be unfairly reduced to
unjustifiable outbursts by young people craving attention-something to be
either tolerated as mere annoyances or extinguished as threats to order. But if
administrators and professors take the time to listen to what students are saying
and explore the issues underlying their grievances, much can be gained. I argue
that colleges and universities move away from the question, "how do we stop
our student activists," toward the question, "what are students learning from
their activism and what, in turn, can the institutions learn from it?"
As I have posited in this Article, one way to start the process of learning
from what student activists have to say is to include students' rights in a
balancing test when speech is disputed-e.g., in student protests involving
invited speaker interruption, unauthorized building and office occupation, and
even various forms of disruption in cyberspace. Such a test should be articulated
in university policies and made binding through contract law. While student
protestors may not always win in the balancing, at least their academic freedom
right to learn, and I would argue teach others, will be part of the conversation.
My hope is that recognition that student protest has positive value to the
university community and is an essential part of academic freedom will begin
to shift attention to the substantive issues underlying student grievances. In this
way, student activism will truly be an opportunity for all to learn.
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